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PREFACE
missions trading has been shunned for a long time by policy-makers in the European
Union as an instrument of environmental policy. It was the Kyoto Protocol that put
emissions trading firmly on the EU agenda for the first time. Ever since, discussions on
implementing an EU-wide scheme have advanced at a rapid pace and, in the specific case of
greenhouse gas emissions trading, the EU and some of its member states have gradually become
a major reference point for this instrument.
The CEPS Task Force on Emissions Trading and the New EU Climate Change Policy focused
on the specific case of greenhouse gas emissions trading in the European Union, notably in
relation to the Commission’s proposed Directive to establish an EU-wide emissions-trading
framework by 2005. Members, who came from a very broad range of backgrounds, including
industry – energy production and supply companies, major energy-intensive industries and
service companies – business associations, environmental non-governmental organisations and
other stakeholders, engaged in a sustained debate on how an EU scheme could fit into overall
EU climate policy.
The Task Force met five times from October 2001 to March 2002. We invited representatives
from the European Commission, national governments, business associations, consultancies and
companies to present their activities, viewpoints and concerns. The presentations were followed
by lively debates among the members whose names are listed in Annex 4. We soon realised that
despite our highly divergent views, there was significant common ground. At our final meeting,
we focused on this common ground, which is presented in the Key Messages and
Recommendations and the Executive Summary at the beginning of this report.
I want to thank the members of the Task Force for their active and positive contributions
throughout the meetings and editing of the final report. Although each member endorses the
general content of the report, one should not conclude that all members subscribe to every
sentence of the text.
Charles Nicholson
Chairman of the CEPS Task Force
Group Senior Adviser, BP
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GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
CONDITIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CREDIBILITY
AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
he European Union (EU) has given substance to its commitment to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions not only by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, but also by signalling its
intention to adopt a package of policy measures to cut GHG emissions in all sectors
(2.1.)
1 of the economy. The central element of the EU strategy to meet its Kyoto targets is a
proposal for an EU-wide emissions-trading scheme establishing an emissions market across the
European Economic Area (EEA) (2.1.1).
1.  The value of emissions trading: Efficient markets and effective targets
Emissions trading is an innovative instrument that has been tried with some success both within
and outside the EU. The most frequently cited precedent is the SO2 trading scheme in the United
States. Other schemes for the trading of GHG allowances have been initiated at national level –
Denmark and the United Kingdom – and company level – e.g. by BP, Shell and DuPont. The
proposed EU-wide scheme, however, is unprecedented because it is the first large-scale cross-
border application of emissions trading.
Emissions trading does not in itself reduce emissions; instead it provides a mechanism by which
emitters – factory operators, oil refineries, etc. – can identify the most cost-effective ways to
reduce their emissions and thus factor carbon-reduction strategies into day-to-day business
decisions (an often-overlooked advantage). Its economic advantage is two-fold: the market price
of carbon is equal to the lowest marginal abatement cost amongst all controlled sources, thereby
ensuring that the environmental goal is met at least cost. At the same time, the carbon price it
generates creates long-term predictability for business, a crucial factor in efficient investment
decisions. Thus, emissions trading goes beyond existing environmental policy – mainly seen as
an inescapable overhead – by establishing a long-term and predictable price signal upon which
to base investment decisions.
In order to create a market and initiate trading, there is a need to create scarcity, which in the
case of GHG emissions must be done by a government decision to set targets. In cap-and-trade
schemes, these targets usually are absolute (e.g. a fixed quantity of CO2 emissions per year),
whereas in baseline-and-credit schemes targets can either be absolute or based on energy
efficiency improvements (4.1). This is among the most controversial elements of any emissions-
trading scheme.
2.  Crucial design options
The advantages of emissions trading will only materialise both if the emissions market is
efficient and liquid and if the scheme leads to credible reductions in GHG emissions (3).
Governments and market participants alike are interested in a market that provides both a
predictable business environment and an agreed environmental outcome. In fact, both are
mutually dependent (3.1.3). A predictable business outcome is necessary for a carbon price
(short and long-term), which in turn will enable market participants to make efficient choices in
the market (3.1.3). To secure these benefits, it is imperative that the market be designed
properly from the outset.
                                                
1 The numbers in parentheses, e.g. (4.1), refer to the section in the main report where the topic in question
is analysed.
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a)  The architecture of the market
Allowances to emit GHGs are intangible assets that behave like property rights. Their value
depends initially on the target and later on consistent and fraud-proof monitoring and
verification procedures. Efficient markets require liquidity, which in return calls for a broad
range of participants. Buyers and sellers are obviously essential, but no less important are the
market-makers such as brokers, speculators or arbitrageurs. Emissions markets must not be
restricted to just the “polluters” but should include the participants that are a feature of any
normal market. Market-share requirements will reduce liquidity and thus the efficiency of the
market. Market restrictions ultimately can annul the economic benefits of emissions trading
(3.1.2) and market signals.
b)  Cap-and-trade or baseline-and-credit?
The Commission’s proposal chooses a cap-and-trade scheme. Such schemes typically cap
company emissions by allocating absolute tonnes of allowances for pollutants. A company must
ensure that it stays below its assigned cap, either by cutting emissions or by buying additional
permits, whichever is cheaper. A company that reduces its emissions by more than the allocated
cap can sell surplus allowances to other companies, at an agreed price. The alternative model is
the “credit-based” scheme. Here, credits are created (i.e. “earned”) when a company reduces its
emissions below the level required by existing source-specific limits set by regulation or a
negotiated agreement. Importantly, targets can be expressed in absolute terms (i.e. as absolute
caps) or relative terms (i.e. as energy-efficiency or per unit of production targets).
Although there is no preference in economic theory decisively favouring either system,
experience with credit schemes in the US show that cap-and-trade schemes tend to be simpler to
manage and provide higher liquidity in the market, and hence higher efficiency (4.1). Credit-
based schemes may be seen as a bridge to the point where industry will accept absolute caps
under a cap-and-trade system. The UK scheme has mixed cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit
schemes, and a similar approach is being considered in France and the Netherlands (4.1).
c)  Target setting and allocation: Two sides of the same coin
The most controversial design option concerns the method used to set targets and create
scarcity. Whatever method is used, allocation leads to considerable distribution effects on the
controlled sources, consumers and governments, i.e. there are winners and losers (4.2). The
allocation methods being discussed in the EU are auctioning, grandfathering, benchmarking and
updating (4.2). Each method has its advantages and disadvantages if evaluated against the
criteria of economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, equity (i.e. distribution effects) and
political acceptability. Nevertheless, the choice between grandfathering or auctioning does not
significantly affect the efficiency of the emissions-trading market in the medium and long-term.
None of these methods is perfect. In the end, allocation will be a political decision and a
political balancing act.
•  Auctioning, which requires each market participant to buy allowances, is potentially the
most economically efficient method and is also theoretically the most environmentally
effective (see 4.1 and Appendix 2). By and large, auctioning provides the strongest market
signals to producers and consumers to reduce pollution, depending on other factors such as
existing distortions in the allowance market. The main shortcomings of auctioning are that it
diverts funds necessary for investing in emissions reductions and energy efficiency and
introduces major uncertainty into the cost of staying in business. Consequently, it would be
likely to have a major negative impact on the competitiveness of European industry,
especially as long as EU industries’ competitors (e.g. in the US and developing countries)
do not face an equivalent target or any target at all (4.2.1). Implementation of the standardGREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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remedy to address distribution impacts in the EU, i.e. the recycling of revenues, is
problematic because the recycling of tax revenues is a competence that rests with the
member states. Any attempt in the Directive to guide the recycling of funds might therefore
require unanimous agreement in the Council of Ministers and could reduce the European
Parliament’s right of co-decision to a role of simple consultation (4.2.4). Auctioning might
simply become a national option for member states seeking opportunities to further raise tax
revenues.
•  Grandfathering, whereby each market participant receives allowances for free based on its
previous emissions, protects competitiveness, but it is potentially less efficient and effective
than auctioning. Grandfathering might be considered to limit revenues for public finances if,
as might occur, emissions trading replaced environmental taxation (4.2.2). Grandfathering is
most credible when it takes account of early emissions reductions and current efficiency
performance.
Benchmarking is a specific form of grandfathering in which allowances are granted on the
basis of a plant’s technologies or techniques and their comparison to other plants.
Benchmarking is theoretically the most equitable approach to allocation, since it is based
on the actual state of technology applied, taking into account past investments. The main
disadvantage is that benchmarking needs considerable current and historical data that are
not always available across the EU, let alone in the candidate countries. Benchmarking
depends on a commonly agreed specific point in time, for which data are available on a
comparable basis. Whether benchmarking will become a widely used option in the future
depends on the future availability of data (4.2.2).
•  The updating approach bases allocations on a plant’s existing activities but takes account of
future needs, i.e. expansion. This is in contrast to grandfathering, where firms receive
allowances irrespective of future activities. In reality, updating therefore comes very close
to a relative target. The difference is that the overall cap in the emissions-trading scheme
remains intact, thereby ensuring environmental effectiveness. The principal advantage is
that it alleviates companies’ fears, at least to some extent, that they will be prevented from
expanding and that those companies that reduce production (for whatever reason) will
benefit disproportionately. The most important disadvantage relates to its potential effects
on economic efficiency. Allowances are allocated in proportion to output and may
constitute an output subsidy; the more a company has produced, the more allowances, i.e.
assets, it would receive. As with relative targets, if the amount of pollution is higher than it
would be without the output subsidy, overall compliance costs would be higher than
otherwise. Should updating be chosen as the method of allocation, the question arises of
whether to create transparent and non-discriminatory methodologies of applying it in
practice across member states or to leave this to member state discretion, subject to single
market rules. There is a risk that different member states will apply data differently.
Whether such methodologies can be developed is unclear at this date (4.2.3).
The other factor that determines the constraint that companies will face is the target (4.3). The
proposed EU Directive suggests that target-setting should be undertaken by member states
according to a number of very general variables that give a high degree of discretion to member
states. There are fears that some member states might unduly favour their companies by setting
overly generous targets, despite rules for notification and the EU’s competition laws (3.2.2;
4.3.2). As a result there have been calls for “objective” target-setting using, for example,
standard performance rate (SPR) indicators at EU level. Such an approach would undoubtedly
both reduce the risk of distortions in the internal market and favour those that have done the
most in the past to control their GHG emissions. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether industry
will be able to provide sufficient data to allow all governments to benchmark against an SPR
(4.3.2).REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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Irrespective of which approach is taken in the end, target-setting will always involve an element
of political bargaining. Even if the target is finally set on a relatively “objective” basis using
SPR, additional flexibility is still provided by choices to be made relating to i) the baseline year,
ii) the gases included and iii) sector coverage. Other elements that could affect the stringency of
the target are the use of relative targets, the inclusion of the project mechanisms, banking
provisions and fixed penalty rates (4.3.3).
d)  Direct or indirect emissions?
Electricity generation can be included in an emissions-trading scheme either directly, where
emissions from electricity generation are reported at the place of generation, or indirectly, where
the emissions are recorded at the point of consumption. The proposed EU Directive has chosen
the former whereas the UK has opted for the latter. Both systems have advantages and
disadvantages (4.1.1). Indirect apportionment tends to be more complicated and undermines the
consistency of the scheme. (Why should electricity be included indirectly and not, for instance,
cement and glass companies, whose emissions could also be reported with the end user, e.g. the
house owner?) Another drawback of indirect emissions is that the end-user is not responsible for
the choice of fuel. The important thing is that the EU chooses a single system. The coexistence
of the EU-wide system (as currently proposed) and the UK system could cause emissions to be
counted twice or not at all.
e)  Which participants?
The trading scheme’s design must balance the priorities of simplicity and a sufficiently large
market to provide the market with liquidity (4.1.2).
•  Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) sometimes argue that they lack the capacity
to deal with a complicated instrument such as emissions trading. This may be true in general
but an SME’s capacity and obligation should depend not only on its size but also on the
characteristics of the emissions source, i.e. whether the SME operates a major on-site power
plant (4.1.2).
•  Transport and the domestic/tertiary sectors are not explicitly covered by the proposed
EU Directive or by most likely national schemes. This is due partly to the complexity and
potentially high transaction costs and partly to political sensitivity towards price increases in
these sectors and inelastic demand. Only Norway has considered partially including
transport and households (via heating fuel and electricity) in its trading scheme (4.1.2 and
Box 4.1). The EU scheme could be kept simple initially, and extended later, but until then
the non-trading sectors must bear an equivalent share of the burden of reducing emissions.
•  Combined heat and power (CHP) is covered by the proposed Directive, but competing
fuels (e.g. gas in condensation boilers) are not. As a result, a technology with a generally
accepted lower environmental impact could lose market share. This could and should be
rectified, for example, by exempting the proportion of fuel used in CHP plants for the
heating market from the trading scheme (4.1.2).
f)  The project mechanisms
Excluding the project mechanisms foreseen under the Kyoto Protocol (Joint Implementation, or
JI, and the Clean Development Mechanism, or CDM) could lead to higher allowance prices than
would otherwise be the case. The Commission justified their exclusion because of “outstanding
issues regarding their environmental integrity” (especially the use of carbon sinks as CDM
projects) but agrees that their eventual inclusion in some form is desirable.
The EU could include the project mechanisms either by applying the rules as agreed in the
UNFCCC negotiations or by specifying separate rules for the EU-wide trading scheme, inGREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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essence creating a separate “EU CDM” and “EU JI”. The latter would imply different rules for
trading internationally and within the EU. Should the EU decide that international rules are not
sufficiently robust to allow for a credible emissions market to evolve, it would be able to make
the case for additional requirements. Such requirements might feature, among others, the
exclusion of credits arising from sinks projects from the EU emissions-trading scheme, given
the uncertainty that still exists regarding their environmental benefits and permanence, and with
the UNFCCC IPCC still to report on them (4.1.3).
The international rules on CDM are likely to become operational by the end of 2002. The EU
would be free to set legitimate additional eligibility requirements for the project mechanisms.
Should the international regime not materialise, moreover, the EU’s scheme would represent a
significant market for CDM credits and would reassure companies that projects are a safe
investment (4.1.3).
The outlook for JI is expected to remain uncertain for the medium term. The EU could therefore
propose an “early “EU JI”, with restrictions if needed, for example limiting the mechanism to
EEA countries and the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe, until firm rules were
agreed internationally and the international regime established. Companies would be free to
choose between operating on the basis of firm rules of the “early EU JI” or the prospective rules
of JI under the international regime, to come at a later stage. If extended beyond the accession
states, for example to Russia, “early EU JI” could have the additional advantage of providing a
potential incentive to Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (4.1.3). Such an early EU JI would
naturally have a set of EU-defined rules, which might differ from those of the UNFCCC for JI.
It should be noted that the EU’s application of additional rules for allowing CDM and/or JI into
the emissions-trading system could have implications for the effective working of these
mechanisms, and possibly for future UNFCCC negotiations. Accordingly, such a step would
need to be considered with care and would require clear justification. It would of course not
affect the use of these mechanisms by EU member states according to the rules of the
UNFCCC.
g)  Gases
The Commission has limited – for the present – the proposed EU scheme to CO2, because it
considers that the other GHGs are difficult to monitor with comparable accuracy. In contrast,
the UK and the proposed Norwegian scheme cover all six GHGs, and the internal BP scheme
covers CO2 and CH4. In France, the existence of an N2O tax means that that gas is measured.
The real issue at EU level, therefore, is a lack of capacity in some member states. This could be
addressed by amending the proposed Directive so that member states could include all six gases
once they can show that measuring is assured, although different gas coverage in different
member states carries the risk of distortions to competition. The European Commission should
consider capacity-building in member states and accession countries with shortcomings in
monitoring.
h)  Banking
Banking, which allows participants to store unused allowances for future use, can lead to earlier
reductions than would have occurred otherwise. Banking is also an effective tool to smooth the
investment cycle for GHG-reduction measures and is therefore likely to reduce compliance
costs. Allowing banking into the Kyoto commitment periods will tend to make governments
less generous towards companies when allocating permits in the pre-Kyoto commitment period
(4.1.5).REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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i)  Penalties
Penalties can have two distinct functions. First, as a tool for enforcing compliance, the penalty
must be high enough to deter non-compliance. Second, penalty rates can act as a safety valve
against the risk of too high allowance prices. In this case the penalty needs to be fixed at a
certain, relatively low level (as for example in the Danish case). While in the long run the
integrity of the emissions-trading regime will only be maintained if compliance is ensured, a
fixed penalty rate at a limited level, especially for the transition period towards an unknown
instrument, can become an efficient tool to prevent emissions trading from damaging EU
competitiveness. There is a danger that a price cap could reduce liquidity, however, because if it
is set too low, the price cap might act as a disincentive for firms to trade (4.1.6).
3.  How to get from here to there: A blueprint for translating national policies into an
EU-wide emissions-trading scheme
Emissions trading, as proposed in the EU Directive is largely incompatible with existing
environmental policies such as regulation, taxation and voluntary or negotiated agreements. For
this reason, the introduction of emissions trading represents a fundamental systems change in
environmental governance (4.4.1). As an inevitable consequence, the proposed Directive
imposes very different costs on member states, sectors and market participants. Those member
states that have done the most to meet their GHG emission-reduction targets under the Kyoto
Protocol (the “early movers”) risk having the highest adaptation costs because they would be
forced to replace their existing climate policies with the new policy (3.2; 4.4). To address this
risk, it might become necessary to allow for a transition period in which existing national
policies are translated into an EU-wide emissions-trading scheme.
a)  Participation in emissions trading must become mandatory according to a definite
timetable.
To address the issue of different adaptation costs, it has been suggested that participation should
be voluntary. It is true that a voluntary scheme, in which member states or companies could
decide whether or not to accept a target and thereby become eligible for trading, would address
the issues of different adaptation costs. It is difficult to see such how a voluntary scheme might
work in practice, however. It takes supply  and  demand to drive a market. Assuming that the
trading scheme were voluntary, those countries with low abatement costs would have little
incentive to join a system with higher abatement costs, since net buyers domestically would
have to pay a higher price than otherwise. Similarly, if decisions on whether to participate were
left to sectors or firms, there would be little interest among the likely buyers. In such a seller’s
market, the economic advantages of emissions trading would be annulled (4.4.2). Nevertheless,
there is case for very restricted and temporary opt-outs to allow for the “translation” of existing
national policies into an EU emissions-trading framework. During this translation period
existing national policies could be translated into an EU-wide emissions-trading scheme. Such a
translation period, thus defined narrowly in comparison to the general concept of a “transition”
period, has the advantage that it more directly addresses the issue of maintaining the momentum
of existing national policies and eases the costs of adaptation, which will vary greatly across the
EU. Still, there remains the risk that a transition period might prolong the period in which little
action is taken, leading to higher emissions and raising the cost of abatement in the future.
b)  A transition or translation period could see temporary opt-outs for sectors subject to
equivalent and credible national carbon policies.
It is essential to handle opt-outs in a restricted way, i.e. to allow opt-outs only for those
companies and sectors that can demonstrate comparable efforts to reduce GHG emissions.GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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Otherwise there is a risk of free-riding. In addition, those years where opt-outs exist would most
likely be high-emissions years, making the later target more difficult and costly to achieve.
Opt-outs theoretically could be done by introducing enabling clauses at three possible levels: i)
EU member state, ii) sector, and iii) company. All three options have serious negative effects
that need to be weighed against the costs. Enabling clauses at member state level would most
likely lead to different national carbon prices and therefore to disconnected national carbon
markets in the European Union. Enabling clauses at sector or company level risk leading to
distortions in the EU Internal Market and would need to be carefully aligned with EC Single
Market rules and competition law (3.2; 4.4.3). Therefore, opt-outs should be conditional on
demonstrating equivalent emissions reductions to satisfy Single Market constraints.
c)  The length of the transition or translation period can be shortened by incentives for
companies or sectors to join as early as possible.
The economic advantages of emissions trading constitute an incentive for companies to join an
EU-wide scheme early on, especially if a clear date is set from which participation in the
scheme becomes mandatory. There are a number of potential incentives that could induce
sectors to join early on and thereby reduce the transition or translation period. These include
decisions on the initial method of allocation, the coverage of greenhouse gases, the baseline
year, sector coverage, price caps on allowances, banking into the Kyoto Protocol’s first
commitment period (2008-12), relatively low initial targets and the use of relative targets (4).
Still, the credibility of the scheme demands that any such initial flexibility must give way to a
clearly defined, transparent and mandatory scheme during the first commitment period (4.4.4).
On the other hand, monitoring, verification and registries and data collection in general to
inform the choice for allocation – irrespective of which method is chosen in the end – should be
mandatory from the earliest stage (4.4.4). Single-market rules imply that installations exempted
from trading would need to show they are delivering comparable reductions.
Key Messages and Recommendations
I.  Key Messages
The CEPS Task Force proposes that discussion of how to implement EU greenhouse gas
emissions trading should focus on the following key issues:
1.  Emissions trading does not in itself reduce emissions. Its advantage is that it can achieve an
environmental target at least cost, thereby freeing up resources for additional environmental
or other policy goals. Another effect is that the resulting carbon price creates long-term
predictability for business, which is a crucial element allowing efficient investment
decisions in carbon-reduction technologies and techniques. Its environmental benefit is that
it sets a firm target, e.g. a cap, which the participants need to reach. Thus, emissions trading
combines a high degree of cost-effectiveness with maximum environmental certainty.
2.  Emissions trading would have very considerable distribution effects on companies,
consumers and governments, however. This is why its introduction would be so difficult.
These distribution effects are particularly reflected in allocation and target-setting. As in all
policies with distribution effects, there is no perfect solution. A political approach is
required that strikes a reasonable balance between the different interests. Nevertheless, once
allocation is implemented, markets will start to work and can deliver both economic and
environmental objectives within the given framework.
3.  Like any market, emissions markets need liquidity, transparency, confidence and stability to
function efficiently. In the emissions market, the need for market efficiency is even more
pronounced given that investment decisions to reduce carbon will rest on the quality of theREPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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long-term carbon price generated by the emissions market. Predictability of the long-term
carbon-price is best served by as few restrictions as possible. The market particularly needs
broad participation, primarily of sellers and buyers but also by “traders”, e.g. speculators,
arbitrageurs and market-makers. These participants buy risk, allow for long-term planning,
smooth market volatility, involve financial services and report prices.
4.  A trading scheme based on on-going voluntary participation is not likely to work. Such a
scheme would lead to a market with an imbalance between sellers and buyers, thereby
restricting the liquidity and, more generally, the efficiency of the market. There might be a
case for a clearly defined “translation” period, during which time existing national policies
could be translated into an EU-wide emissions-trading scheme. This concept of a
“translation” period, defined narrowly in contrast to the more general concept of
“transition”, has the advantage of more directly addressing the issue of maintaining the
momentum of existing national policies and easing the costs of adaptation, which will vary
greatly across the EU. A more general “transition” period might risk prolonging the period
in which little action is undertaken, leading to high emissions and thereby making
abatement more costly in the future. Irrespective of which concept will prevail (“transition”
or “translation”), some elements of voluntarism in the temporary changeover phase would
be a tool to keep the drive of existing policies and reduce costs of adaptation. Any decision
to allow participation in the trading scheme to be voluntary initially would be helped if it
were combined with incentives for companies or sectors to join as early as possible. Such
incentives could concern the initial method of allocation, the coverage of greenhouse gases,
the choice of baseline year, sector coverage, price caps on the cost of allowances, banking
into the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (2008-2012) and the targets or the use of
relative targets per unit of production.
II.  Recommendations
The CEPS Task Force has agreed on the following conclusions:
Market architecture
1.  Participation should balance practicality and simplicity, recognising the need to create a
critical mass through a sufficiently large market (4.1.2).
a)  The size of the company should not be used as the only criterion to determine
participation. The capacity of an SME to participate depends not only on the company’s
size, but also on the characteristics of the emissions source (e.g. a large on-site power
plant) (4.1.2).
b)  At the EU level, there is no simple way to include the transport or tertiary sectors in a
trading scheme. For practical reasons, therefore, these sectors have to be excluded, at
least initially (4.1.2).
c)  The proposed Directive might lead to a reduction of market share of CHP in the heat
market. This might be rectified, for example, by exempting from the threshold for
trading the proportion of fuel used in CHP plants for the heating market (4.1.2).
2.  Participation in the trading scheme should be open to as many market intermediaries as
possible (3.1.3).
3.  The group has no single view on the use of the project mechanisms. Some participants feel
that the project mechanisms should be included in the proposed EU trading scheme as soon
as possible. Others expressed serious reservations concerning their likely environmental
integrity, and regard the scheme as a measure to achieve domestic emissions reductions.
The EU should base its approach on the rules as agreed in the UNFCCC negotiations toGREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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avoid fragmentation of the international trading regime. Should the EU legitimately feel that
international rules are not sufficiently robust, however, it would still be able to add
guidelines to safeguard market efficiency and environmental integrity (4.1.3). For instance,
it may make sense to allow only credits arising from emission reductions, rather than sinks,
to be consistent with the aims of the emissions-trading scheme.
a)  Rules for the CDM should be based on international rules as agreed within the
UNFCCC negotiations, which are likely to become operational by the end of 2002. The
EU would be able to set additional eligibility requirements, if there is a legitimate case
to be made, for example, to avoid deflation of allowances or to safeguard environmental
integrity (4.1.3).
b)  As for JI, where the outlook for international rules is less certain, the EU could initiate
an “early EU JI”, which would be in place until firm rules were agreed internationally
and the international regime established. Companies would be free to choose between
operating on the basis of firm rules of the “early EU JI” or the prospective rules of JI
under the international regime, to come at a later stage. “Early EU JI” could include
accession states and could also be extended to the countries of the former Soviet Union,
thereby offering the additional advantage of providing a potential incentive to Russia to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol (4.1.3). As with CDM, the EU may insist on additional rules
to safeguard the environmental integrity of the system.
c)  For both JI and CDM, such additional rules could have implications for the effective
working of these mechanisms and possibly for future UNFCCC negotiations, so such a
step would need to be considered with care and would need clear justification. It would
of course not affect use of these mechanisms by EU member states according to the
rules of the UNFCCC.
4.  As soon as measuring and monitoring can be ensured, the proposed EU Directive
should include non-CO2 GHGs (4.1.4).
5.  Member States should allow banking into the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period
(2008-12). This would ensure that governments are likely to be less generous to “their”
companies when allocating permits in the pre-Kyoto commitment period. Banking is
also an indispensable tool to smooth the investment cycle for GHG reduction measures
and therefore is likely to reduce compliance costs (4.1.5).
6.  The integrity of the emissions-trading regime will only be maintained if compliance is
ensured. A fixed penalty rate at a relatively low level, especially for the transition
period towards an unknown instrument, can become an efficient tool to prevent
emissions trading from damaging EU competitiveness. It is essential to strike a fair
balance between what would be needed to prevent the system from becoming a
disincentive to trade and what is required to avoid hurting European business (4.1.6).
7.  It is preferable to include emissions from electricity directly, i.e. at the point of
production rather than consumption, because it is less complicated to implement,
especially with an integrated EU network and cross-border trade. The important thing is
that the EU must agree on a single approach to be consistently applied at EU and
member-state level (4.1.1).
8.  Restrictions on trading volumes should be avoided, because they are detrimental to
economic efficiency and market confidence, without adding to environmental
effectiveness (3.1).
Allocation
9.  Allocation should aim to maximise fairness and minimise costs (4.2).REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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10. The initial allocation should take into the account the fact that some competitors of EU
industries are not subject to the same constraint. Once the carbon constraint is more
widely distributed, perhaps also extended to the United States, the allocation principle
could be adapted more universally (4.2).
11. Allocation must not punish “early movers”, i.e. those who have done most in the past.
Thus, grandfathering based on historical baseline emissions should be adjusted to take
account of relative performance (4.2.1).
12. Auctioning is favoured by those who have argued in favour of taxing energy products,
as a way of giving price signals to consumers (4.2.2).
13. Auctioning (and partial auctioning) has economic efficiency and single market
advantages and may attract governments seeking extra tax revenues, but it would
introduce uncertainties into the cost of staying in business, as well as diverting funds
needed to invest in efficiency improvements and reducing emissions (4.2.2).
14. Benchmarking should be considered as a suitable instrument for allocation to take
account of relative performance, provided the necessary data are available (4.2.2).
15. Likewise, updating allowances can provide flexibility to firms and thereby alleviate
fears that an absolute cap might impede growth (4.2.3).
16. The EU Directive should give a clear indication of how allocation will be undertaken
after 2007 (e.g. in Annex III to the Directive), to avoid introducing regulatory
uncertainty that would hinder the investment needed to achieve emissions reductions
and increase energy efficiency. Only a long-term predictable carbon price – expressed
in the forward curve – will trigger the necessary investments in carbon-reduction
technologies and techniques (3.1; 4.2).
Target setting
17. The decision on the allocation method should not be seen in isolation from target-
setting (4.3).
18. The many variables in target setting (e.g. environmental performance in the past, the
market situation and forecasts, a company’s economic condition, the choice of baseline
year, the inclusion of non-CO2 GHGs) can offer flexibility that can be used to ensure
environmental effectiveness while moderating the impacts on competitiveness (4.3.2).
19. Relative targets (and therefore baseline-and-credit schemes), especially during a
transition period, are seen by some as valuable, because they recognise the need for
companies to respond to the growth of the economy (4.3.1).
20. Non-trading sectors, notably transport and the domestic sector, should be subject to
comparable measures to ensure a wide and even contribution to efforts of meeting
targets once caps are imposed on the trading sector (4.1.2).
Translating national policies into an EU emissions-trading scheme
21. Although a trading scheme based on voluntary participation does not appear to be a
desirable option, there is still scope for temporarily opt-outs for sectors during a
changeover period in which existing national policies will be translated into an EU-wide
emissions-trading scheme. Such a changeover (or “translation”) period should address
the issue of maintaining the momentum of existing national policies and ease the costs
of adaptation for those who have credible policies in place (4.4).GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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22. A precondition for permitting any voluntary participation in the scheme is the certainty
that at a given date, the trading scheme will become mandatory (4.4.3).
23. In any such temporary voluntary phase, governments may wish to increase the
acceptability of emissions trading by offering incentives for firms to join. Such
incentives, which could be related to targets, gases, baseline years, price caps or
banking provisions, must nevertheless be compatible with the rules of the internal
market and EC competition law (4.4.4).
24. On the other hand, transparent monitoring, verification and registries, and more
generally data collection to inform allocation, should be mandatory from the earliest
stages (4.4.4), and will serve as the basis for demonstrating equivalent emissions
reductions to satisfy single market constraints.13
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
he ministerial conference in Marrakech (COP7) in November 2001, confirmed the
political agreement struck in Bonn the previous July to salvage the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
following the US withdrawal of its support for the treaty earlier that year. COP7 led to
the adoption of a set of agreements, the Marrakech Accords, that lays the foundation for a
legally binding international climate regime. The Marrakech Accords offer the prospect that
enough countries might ratify the Kyoto Protocol to bring it into force.
Irrespective of whether or not the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, the European Union has
reiterated its declared policy to assume a leadership role in international negotiations. To this
end, it made a formal political commitment to implement the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol,
unilaterally if necessary. It lived up to its promise to provide international leadership before and
during the difficult negotiations of COP6 (Part II) in Bonn and during COP7. It was much to the
credit of the EU that the international community reached agreement despite the withdrawal of
the US. Likewise, the EU has begun to give substance to its political commitment domestically,
first by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on 31 May 2002, and second by introducing a package of
measures designed to allow the 15 EU member states collectively to meet the agreed target of
reducing their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 8% below 1990 levels by 2010.
2
This package includes measures in such areas as the promotion of combined heat and power
(CHP) and electricity from renewable energy, new energy efficiency standards and policies to
reduce the environmental impact of transport. The centrepiece of the EU policy on climate
change, however, is a proposal for a Directive establishing an EU-wide emissions-trading
scheme. If adopted by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, the European
Commission’s proposal will lead to the establishment of a trading scheme that will come into
operation by 2005 and will cover some 45% of total CO2 emissions in the EU.
Emissions trading is an innovative environmental instrument that has been tried with some
success, but never on such a scale as is being proposed by the European Commission. The most
frequently cited precedent is the US SO2 trading scheme, the world’s first large-scale
application of a “cap-and-trade” system for addressing an environmental problem. Other
schemes for the trading of GHGs have been initiated at national level in Denmark and the
United Kingdom and at company level in such firms as BP, Shell and DuPont. Implementation
of an EU-wide scheme – which would potentially include all the countries of the European
Economic Area (EEA) as well as the new EU member states after enlargement – would be
unprecedented, however, representing the first large-scale, cross-border application.
Emissions trading does not in itself reduce emissions; it merely provides a market-friendly
mechanism by which the emitters have much latitude in selecting the most cost-effective ways
to reduce their emissions. A consequent and often overlooked benefit of this scheme is that
companies are given an incentive to factor carbon-reduction strategies into their day-to-day
business decisions. The economic value of trading is that it equalises the marginal cost of
abatement among all controlled sources and thereby ensures the meeting of the environmental
goal at least cost. At the same time, the carbon price that is generated by an emissions-trading
scheme creates long-term predictability for business, which is a crucial factor in making
informed and efficient investment decisions. Thus, emissions trading goes beyond existing
environmental policy – where it is mainly seen as an inescapable overhead – by establishing a
long-term and predictable price signal upon which to base investment decisions. The
environmental value is provided by the great certainty of emissions trading: a cap-and-trade
                                                
2 The Kyoto Protocol controls six GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
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system, such as is proposed by the European Commission, sets an overall limit on emissions but
leaves open the question of which sources will be abated. It is this target that provides the
environmental benefit of the scheme.
This report assesses the dynamics of the EU emissions-trading regime both for the EU and its
member states and for the international climate regime. In particular, the report seeks to identify
the conditions under which an EU-wide emissions-trading scheme can deliver both on its
economic and environmental promises. Emissions trading only makes sense if both
environmental and economic objectives are met in a cost-effective way. The focus – a novel
one, we think – is the market place. The report asks how the market can contribute to achieving
both environmental and economic objectives and, by extension, how governments can support
the emerging emissions markets.
Chapter 2 presents a short overview of the climate debate both within the European Union and
internationally and how this debate might affect the EU’s emerging emissions markets.
Chapter 3 focuses on “the market”: how it is emerging, its workings and its dynamics. It shows
that – given proper rules – environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency can go hand-in-
hand. The second part of Chapter 3 analyses how emissions trading will inevitably interact with
the EU internal market and how this might influence the linkages between trading within the EU
and in third countries.
Chapter 4 essentially takes a “regulator’s view” in analysing the major design options that are
currently proposed and under discussion and draws conclusions.
The report is preceded by an Executive Summary and Key Messages and Recommendations,
which present the main findings of the report.
A couple of appendices provide further explanation of the main issues, one distinguishing the
different types of emissions trading in operation and the other analysing the difference between
auctioning versus grandfathering. There is also a glossary of terms and abbreviations often
encountered in the field of climate change. Finally, Appendix 4 supplies a list of members of the
Task Force and invited guests and speakers.15
CHAPTER 2
EMISSIONS TRADING AND EU CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
he European Union’s self-declared policy has been to assume a leadership role in the
international climate change debate. At the Göteborg European Council
3 in June 2001,
the 15 EU member states made a collective political commitment to implement the
Kyoto Protocol, unilaterally if necessary, despite the US rejection of the treaty in March 2001.
This pledge was followed up by the European Commission in October 2001, with the launch of
a climate change policy package comprising three main elements:
•  A proposal for the EU’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002,
•  A Communication outlining ten specific actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
•  A proposal for a Directive establishing an EU-wide emissions-trading scheme to begin in
2005.
4
Of these proposals, ratification was completed when the EU and the 15 member states
simultaneously deposited their instruments of ratification at the United Nations headquarters in
New York on 31 May 2002. Other measures are in the process of being prepared by the
European Commission or, in the case of the proposal for a Directive on EU-wide emissions
trading, are pending adoption.
2.1 The EU policy package
EU climate change policy is based on the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), a
multi-stakeholder initiative established in 2000 to identify cost-effective ways for the EU to
meet its Kyoto commitments.
5 In its Communication of October 2001, the Commission
highlights 12 of the 40-odd measures to abate GHG emissions that were examined in the
ECCP’s final report, published in June 2001. These measures, for which legislation will be
formally proposed over the next two years, include the development of renewable energy
sources, improved energy performance of buildings, energy efficiency standards, energy
demand management, the promotion of CHP and measures to support a modal shift in transport
from road to rail and water. The Communication prioritises cost-effectiveness, identifying many
measures that could be executed for less than €20 per tonne of CO 2 abated and some at a
negative cost. The Communication also includes certain measures such as the promotion of
CHP and the development of biofuels that are potentially more expensive than €20/tCO 2 abated
but could be more economically beneficial in the long-term, particularly when other benefits
such as reduced local pollution are factored in.
2.1.1 Emissions trading
The cornerstone of the European Union’s strategy to meet its Kyoto targets is a proposal for an
EU-wide emissions-trading scheme. The proposed Directive aims at establishing a framework
for a cap-and-trade emissions market that would operate across the European Economic Area
(EEA), comprising the EU and Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, from 2005 onwards. In its
first stage the proposed trading scheme would only cover CO2 emissions from large industrial
and energy installations. Such installations number between 4,000 and 5,000 across the EU and
                                                
3 The European Council, consisting of the heads of government and state and the European Commission
President, meets four times a year to provide guidance on the day-to-day management of the EU and to
take strategic decisions.
4 European Commission (2001a, 2001b and 2001c), respectively.
5 European Commission (2001d).
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are projected to account for about 46% of total EU CO2 emissions in 2010.
6 The scheme would
cover, in particular, electricity and heat generation, cement production and pulp and paper
production; these sectors alone represent some 40% of total EU CO2 emissions. The chemicals
sector is not covered, partly because it is responsible for less than 1% of total EU CO2 emissions
and partly because the high number of installations (approximately 34,000 plants) would
complicate a scheme that aims at simplicity. Nevertheless, 60% of all emissions from the
chemical sector are covered indirectly through the inclusion of power generation (Stronzik and
Cames, 2002, p. 14). Additional sectors include other energy (e.g. refining, coke ovens), iron
and steel, glass, ceramics and paper and board. In 2004, the Commission will consider an
extension of the Directive to more sectors and non-CO2 GHGs. The proposal is currently under
discussion in the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, both of which must
adopt the text for it to enter into force.
Under the Commission’s proposal, each affected installation will require a permit to emit
GHGs. These permits build on the permitting procedures that exist under the existing Directive
on integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC). The permits themselves are not tradable,
but they are matched by tradable allowances that are allocated by the member state: if a
company emits in excess of its permits, it must either purchase additional allowances to match
the additional emissions or pay a penalty. The penalty rate is either €100 per tonne of excess
CO2 emitted or twice the average market price of an allowance during a predetermined period,
whichever is higher. Banking is allowed and member states are free to decide whether to allow
banking into the first Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-12).
During the pilot phase of the proposed EU-wide trading scheme in 2005-07, allowances will be
allocated for free (this is known as “grandfathering”) by each member state according to a
national allocation plan. The plan must be approved by the Commission to ensure compatibility
with EU internal market and competition rules. For the 2008-12 period, when the trading
scheme is due to become fully operational, the Commission intends to specify a harmonised
method of allocation, but this harmonised method has yet to be decided upon.
Significantly, this scheme will be independent of the Kyoto Protocol’s International Emissions
Trading (IET) scheme but is intended to be compatible with it.
7 Initially, credits from the Kyoto
Protocol project mechanisms will not be tradable in the scheme, although the European
Commission is expected to announce an additional proposal for a Directive covering this aspect
soon.
The European Commission has based its proposal on a cap-and-trade scheme, the standard
model for many tradable permit schemes. Such a scheme sets absolute emissions ceilings (caps)
below which companies covered by the scheme must remain. To stay below the ceiling,
companies can either reduce emissions through abatement measures or buy extra allowances on
the emissions market; unused allowances can likewise be sold on the emissions market. Cap-
and-trade schemes are generally regarded as having a number of environmental and economic
advantages. In particular, the cap on emissions provides a high level of certainty. This certainty
combines environmental assurance with relatively high degrees of stability and predictability,
which are crucial elements to allow companies make informed investment decisions.
Furthermore, if properly designed, cap-and-trade schemes tend to be the least complex trading
approach to controlling emissions, with lower transaction costs than other trading schemes.
These advantages notwithstanding, industry is sometimes opposed to a cap-and-trade approach
because of the potential negative effects of absolute caps, which are sometimes seen as a
                                                
6 Equivalent to 38 % of the EU’s total GHG emissions in 2010, (European Commission, 2001d).
7 According to Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, IET permits the transfer of parts of AAUs (see Appendix
3) between Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, but these AAUs will not be tradable under the proposed EU-
wide trading scheme.GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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potential brake on economic growth and competitiveness. Another fear relates to the concern
that allocating allowances by auctioning (as opposed to grandfathering) might transfer assets
from industry to governments, thereby making investment more difficult.
The alternative trading model to cap-and-trade is based on resources or credits, the so-called
baseline-and-credit schemes. Such a trading scheme is comparable to the Kyoto project
mechanisms known as Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), in which credits are created, i.e. “earned”. In a baseline-and-credit scheme, a source
earns credits when it reduces its emissions below the level required by existing source-specific
limits set by regulation or a negotiated agreement. Targets can be expressed in absolute terms
(i.e. as absolute caps) or in specific terms (i.e. as energy-efficiency targets). In Europe, major
industries have negotiated agreements based on relative targets and are therefore reluctant to
accept absolute caps. For this reason, credit-based schemes might be seen as a bridge to the
point where industry will accept absolute caps and move over to a cap-and-trade system; indeed,
the UK schemes combine cap-and-trade with baseline-and-credit features. Similar ideas are
being discussed in France. For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 4, section 4.1 and
Appendix 1.
2.2 The international agenda
The Marrakech Accords of November 2001 at the 7
th Conference of the Parties (COP7)
translated into legal language the political agreement struck in Bonn in July 2001, when Parties
settled the remaining controversial issues, such as compliance, the rules of the mechanisms and
the use of sinks to meet the Kyoto targets (UNFCCC, 2001; den Elzen and de Moor, 2001).
From an operational point of view, perhaps the most relevant decision of COP7 was to appoint
the Executive Board for the CDM, which is in charge of making the CDM operational as soon
as possible. This could happen as early as the end of 2002.
To enter into force, the Kyoto Protocol must be ratified by at least 55 countries, including
countries representing at least 55% of 1990 greenhouse gas emissions in industrialised
countries. The first condition has already been met, but the second one has been made far more
difficult due to the withdrawal of the United States, which alone accounted for 34.2% of 1990
industrialised country emissions. The ratification by the 15 EU member states and that of the
Central and Eastern European states – all of which are expected to ratify – will account for only
for 24.2% of 1990 emissions. Following the ratification by Japan (representing 8.1% of 1990
industrialised country emissions) in June 2002, it is Russia, with 26.6% of the relevant
emissions, that holds the de facto casting vote on whether the Protocol will ever come into
force.
Should the Kyoto Protocol not enter into force, the EU will have to live up to its pledge to
implement the Kyoto Protocol commitments unilaterally. But even if the Kyoto Protocol does
enter into force, the international climate regime is likely to be disconnected, characterised by
the co-existence of different approaches rather than a coordinated global effort to tackle climate
change. Of course, the original UNFCCC always foresaw action according to “common but
differentiated responsibilities”, but the Kyoto Protocol assumed at least that the industrialised
countries would share roughly comparable goals, including a legally binding target. Instead, the
US withdrawal from the entire Kyoto process means that industry in the US will not face such a
stringent carbon constraint as that in the EU, if at all. It is also possible that some other
industrialised countries, such as Australia and Canada, will also decline to ratify. EU climate
change policy will have to take account of the fact that European industry’s major competitors
will face a different carbon constraint.18
CHAPTER 3
EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE INTERNAL MARKET:
BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR A FUNCTIONING MARKET
o date, emissions trading in Europe has occurred from the bottom up, i.e. through the
largely uncoordinated evolution of various national and company schemes. In the
absence of an EU-wide framework for emissions trading, different countries have chosen
different design options for their national schemes. The result is a heterogeneous mix of
schemes, as described in Table 3.1.
The European Commission’s proposal for an EU-wide emissions-trading Directive attempts to
harmonise the principal elements of emissions trading in Europe to create an efficient market
across the EEA. Theoretically such a market could also be created by linking different national
schemes (see Haites and Mullins, 2001), although this would raise a number of issues related to
the EU internal market. Regardless of whether the EU emissions market develops from the
bottom up via the linking of separate national schemes, or top down via central coordination, it
is likely to offer lessons for the international climate regime.
3.1 What are efficient emission markets?
The promise of emissions trading lies in economic efficiency. This implies both the abatement
of GHG emissions at least cost and a long-term and predictable carbon price, which ensures
efficient investment decisions to reduce GHG emissions. A precondition for this economic
efficiency to materialise is the proper functioning of markets, i.e. the absence of distortions. The
following section attempts to consider what are the basic criteria that are characteristic of well
functioning markets.
 3.1.1 How markets develop
Historically, markets have developed naturally and on an ad hoc basis, with at first no universal
standards. In the early trade of grain, for example, markets evolved locally, were characterised
by local prices and were informed by subjective analysis. As a result, these markets were highly
volatile and it was impossible to manage risk or make secure investments. The development of
transport led to bigger markets, which (since market participants no longer had to meet face to
face) increasingly required objective standardisation to build trust and liquidity. This was
facilitated by the development of non-traditional market participants, such as speculators who
added sophistication to the market and, consequently, both confidence and expectations.
Permit markets are somewhat different because they do not evolve on an ad hoc basis but
instead emerge as a result of a specific government objective. In the case of emissions trading,
the government aims to restrict the right to emit GHGs. This artificially creates a new set of
assets (emissions permits are “quasi property rights”) and is necessarily accompanied by rules
on how these assets can be traded. Once the policy goal is defined and the assets are established,
the permit market should in principle work like any other market. In addition, a successful
permit market leads to extra benefits, including signals to direct investment and finance the
development and diffusion of new technologies (e.g. by forward selling), risk management and
the minimisation of transaction costs.
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Table 3.1  Main features of European emissions-trading schemes (adopted or under
discussion)
*  Proposal adopted by Parliament on 18 June 2002, although additional legislation is required before the
scheme can enter into force. This legislation will also depend on the outcome of the EU emissions trading
scheme, which will also have an effect on Norway.
** Under consideration.
Source: Adapted from Egenhofer (2002).
Participation Credit trading Allocation Allowance
trading
Absolute Relative Auctioning Grand-
fathering
Sector
coverage
(sectors’ % of
emissions)
No. of Gases
Mandatory Voluntary
Danish power
sector 3 Power (40%) 1 3
UK Emissions
Trading Group Mixed 3 Industry,
tertiary 6 3
French EpE
proposal 3 3 3 Industry,
transport** 6
Norway* 3 3 (partly) 3
Industry
(30%)
households,
transport**
6 3
Sweden
(under
discussion)
3 3
BP target &
trade 3 3 - 2 3
Shell STEPS 3 3 - 1 3
3 (during
pilot
phase) EU proposal 3
(left open until after
pilot phase)
Large
industrial
sources (45%)
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3.1.2 Criteria for efficiency of emissions markets
The promise of economic efficiency (i.e. least-cost abatement or a long-term price signal) will
only occur if the following basic requirements are met.
1.  A commodity with an inherent value. Emissions rights are intangible assets
8 that depend
initially on a cap on emissions and subsequently on consistent and fraud-proof monitoring
and verification procedures. This implies that the commodity must be sheltered from the
risk of devaluation as might occur, for example, by an inflow of allowances from a
questionable source. In order to make the commodity tradable, it needs to be expressed in
terms of a common currency or a set of convertible currencies. The most straightforward
currency for an emissions-trading market would appear to be tonnes of CO2 equivalent
(tCO2e).
9 Ideally, there should also be standardisation of the commodity, although efficient
markets can cope with a lack of standardisation through price variations, e.g. according to
vintage, origin, etc.
2.  Liquidity.  Efficient markets require liquidity, which in turn calls for a broad range of
participants. The first essential participants are buyers and sellers, but no less important are
the traders – the speculators,  arbitrageurs and market-makers. The traders buy the risk,
allow long-term planning, smooth market volatility and get other parts of the economy (e.g.
financial services)
10 involved in the market. This implies that an emissions-trading market
must not be restricted to just the “polluters” but should include all the other participants that
are a feature of any normal market.
3.  Transparency. Markets depend on independent information to allow market participants to
make informed decisions of whether to buy or sell. In other markets, this information
typically comes in aggregate form from brokers, specialised news agencies and newspapers.
A high number of market participants will also contribute to price transparency.
4.  Confidence and stability. Market participants require stability and dislike frequent rule
changes. The US SO 2 trading scheme, which has a 30-year regulatory regime, is perhaps an
extreme example of the kind of predictability that market participants prefer. There should
also be clarity as soon as possible about the interactions between the emissions market and
other markets, such as those for renewable energy certificates. Given that the international
climate regime will emerge only gradually, however, some changes in rules triggered by
international negotiations will be indispensable.
5.  Risk management. In order to enable market participants to manage risk – a key function of
markets – there is a need for a reliable forward curve, i.e. a mechanism that allows the trade
of future allowances at a predetermined price. This allows market actors to assess future
opportunities or liabilities of transactions, for example. A successful market allows
predictability for investment and thereby provides the certainty that allows business with
long-term rates of return to make the best investment decisions, for instance whether to
invest in new equipment to reduce emissions or to buy extra allowances. Such information
facilitates decision-making and is therefore good for business. Incidentally, this forward
curve provides governments with a reliable estimate of future carbon prices and therefore
                                                
8 They behave like property rights in a market.
9 Tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) is the unit used by the UNFCCC. It is possible, however, that this
currency will be redefined in the future as definitions are revised. For instance, the IPCC’s estimation of
the global warming potential (GWP) of a GHG over 100 years depends on scientific evidence, and the
GWP definitions could change over time as scientific understanding improves. Like monetary currencies,
the relative values of convertible emissions trading currencies can change over time. If the rules are clear,
markets can accommodate such changes.
10 For an overview of the financial services industry in emissions trading, see Janssen (2002).GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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the ability to predict the costs of future GHG emissions reductions. It is important to note
that there is tension between a predictable forward curve and a trading scheme that is based
on “learning-by-doing”, which in reality amounts to a kind of voluntary approach. Although
business might prefer a system based on learning-by-doing for such an innovative policy
tool, it contradicts the establishment of real trades and their associated benefits.
6.  Standardised operation. In order to speed up operation and lower transaction costs, markets
need a standardised method of operation, i.e. clear market rules. Market rules usually come
in the form of a standard contract and standard clearing and settlement procedures.
Reporting and verification standards, compiled in a protocol or manual, for instance, would
also facilitate such standardisation.
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3.1.3 Efficient markets and environmental effectiveness
An efficient market depends on a long-term stable business environment. Without predictability,
markets cannot function properly, so participants in the emissions market will demand a stable
or at least a predictable environment. At the same time, governments, citizens and
environmental NGOs will demand that environmental objectives are met. By and large, these
two priorities, i.e. efficiency and environmental effectiveness, are compatible and are even
mutually dependent. Even if emitters and environmental NGOs might hold different views on
the severity of the targets, the market prefers credible targets, which not only increase liquidity
but also reassures governments and society that the trading process will lead to credible
reductions in GHG emissions. This is a vital precondition for stability and a protection against
frequent regulatory changes. In the end, however, target-setting is the job of the political
process.
As an example of this convergence of interests, all stakeholders share an interest in safeguards
against the devaluation of the commodity, such as rules on the use of allowances from
untrustworthy sources, and in price transparency, which is necessary to obtain information on
abatement costs. There is also at least a partial common interest concerning price caps on
penalties: high penalties can be seen as necessary to ensure environmental effectiveness, and a
price cap – if set too low – can be seen as a danger to liquidity and a disincentive for firms to
trade.
Similarly, the respective proponents of market efficiency and environmental effectiveness are
both sceptical about voluntary or “learning-by-doing” approaches. Such approaches are limited
in their ability to create properly functioning markets and therefore might deny the advantages
of emissions markets outlined above. Likewise, there is broad convergence on the relative
merits of baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade systems. In a baseline-and-credit system,
permits are allocated in principle ex post,
12 which means that trading cannot really begin until
the end of the compliance period (apart from some forward or derivatives trading). The effect of
this is to restrict the market to emitting companies, with an overall negative effect on liquidity
and volatility. In a cap-and-trade system, by contrast, permits are allocated ex ante. This has the
double advantage of promoting emissions trading immediately, since allowances become
available early on and increasing liquidity through the participation of non-natural traders, such
as brokers and arbitrageurs. By way of example, the early US credit-trading schemes created
                                                
11 For examples of greenhouse gas measuring, reporting and verification protocols, see the EpE
Measuring and Reporting Protocol (www.epe.asso.fr) and the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development/World Resources Institute  Greenhouse Gas Protocol,  http://www.wbcsd.org,
http://www.wri.org. The Norwegian scheme for an offshore CO2 tax initially used a 13-page manual,
which, through revisions based on practical experience, quickly became very accurate.
12 Baseline and credit systems can work with  ex-ante allocations, although this would require an
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political uncertainty regarding target-setting and verifications, leading to various changes in the
regulatory environment (Godard, 2000).
One difference in opinion that might divide the market-makers from governments, citizens and
environmental NGOs lies in the desirability of including “non-polluters” such as speculators and
other market intermediaries in the market. Some stakeholders object in principle to the profit of
non-polluters from “licences to pollute”. Notwithstanding this objection, market intermediaries
are important not only for efficiency but also to promote transparency and capacity-building.
This is particularly important because there is a need for an infrastructure to develop such a new
market.
3.2 The EU internal market: The horns of a dilemma
The bottom-up manner in which emissions trading has emerged so far in the European Union
has naturally led to a heterogeneity of different emissions-trading schemes. It has fallen to the
European Commission, as the EU’s competition authority, to ensure that this does not
undermine the functioning of the internal market. Should the EU decide to adopt the proposal
for an EU-wide emissions-trading regime, such a “bottom-up” approach of ex-post scrutiny by
the Commission as competition authority would be replaced by a mandatory and centralised
EU-wide solution. This “top-down” approach has a number of legal and economic advantages,
including higher certainty through  ex-ante  definition of design options, a lower risk of
distortions to competition and potentially higher liquidity in the permit market. These
conflicting approaches pose a dilemma for regulators.
3.2.1 Early action and the EU Directive
In the transitional period up until 2008, when the first Kyoto Protocol Commitment Period of
2008-12 is due to begin, the European Commission faces a potential dilemma. On the one hand,
the Commission and the EU as a whole welcome early action, whether through national
emissions-trading schemes like that of the UK
13 or through other, voluntary approaches such as
the German Selbstverpflichtung. On the other hand, the Commission intends to establish an EU-
wide scheme that will cover all member states from 2005, but this could mean a conflict
between the mandatory EU-wide scheme and the existing national policies. This is because
national initiatives would have to cease operations by 2005 or become fully compatible with the
EU-wide scheme. The UK and Norwegian schemes are not compatible with the EU-wide
scheme as it is currently proposed, but a decision to close those schemes prematurely would
restrict the trading activity in these national schemes.
Thus, the future holds two distinct options. If the EU scheme becomes mandatory and prevails
over national initiatives, as the current proposal foresees, national schemes will have to be
adapted to the EU-wide scheme or be closed down. Prior to the agreement on the details of the
EU Directive between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, it is impossible to
say what “adaptation” would mean. On the other hand, if the EU scheme – once adopted –
contains elements of voluntary participation, such as making participation voluntary or allowing
participants to choose between trading and such other policy instruments as taxation, two
questions emerge. The first is the role of EU competition policy. The second is how national
schemes could be linked to provide the necessary liquidity in the permit market.
3.2.2 The role of EC competition law
A variety of national emissions-trading schemes could have a potential impact on competition
within the EU’s internal market. As the EU’s competition authority, it is the European
Commission’s task under Art. 87 of the EC Treaty to examine the compatibility of national
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emissions-trading schemes (as well as other measures) with “fair competition”. Member states
must notify the European Commission of any emissions-trading scheme, and the Commission in
return examines and either approves, blocks or asks for revisions of the scheme. The
Commission is therefore likely to play a defining role in the development and implementation of
emissions-trading schemes, particularly in the period before an EU-wide scheme is finally
adopted. The final scheme must be in line with the EU’s competition and internal market rules.
Box 3.1 When does state intervention becomes state aid?
Four criteria to be met simultaneously:
-  There is evidence of an advantage to a company as a result of state aid, such as reduced
costs.
-  State resources have been given to a company. “Resources” include budget resources,
grants, tax reductions or measures that involve a loss of potential resources to a state (such
as selling something below market price). Any public body has the ability to grant such
resources.
-  The state’s measure is selective, in that certain companies or certain productions benefit. If
the measure did not distinguish between parts of the economy, it would not be a state aid
but a “general measure”. Selectivity can be in law but also in fact.
-  The measure has an effect on trade. If a company exports, then a state aid will automatically
have an effect on trade. Even if it does not export, however, the fact that it receives a state
aid allows it to resist imports more easily. Case law in the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
goes further: even if there is no trade, it impedes potential future development of trade.
To date, EU competition law has had little to say about the compatibility between emissions-
trading schemes and state aid rules. The European Commission adopted new  Community
guidelines on State aid for environmental protection in December 2000, but they offer only
limited indication on the compatibility of policies and measures with competition and internal
market rules. The relevant text states only that “some of the means adopted by Member States to
comply with the objectives of the [Kyoto] Protocol could constitute State aid but it is still too
early to lay down the conditions for authorising any such aid.”
14 Thus, it seems instructive to
analyse the first two state aid rulings: the Danish CO2 quota scheme and the UK emissions-
trading scheme.
Case 1. The Danish CO2 quota scheme
Denmark’s emissions-trading programme began in April 2001. The scheme is limited to the
electricity sector, which produces 40% of Denmark’s GHG emissions – 30 mtCO2 per year. The
Danish scheme sets a decreasing ceiling over the years 2001-03 for the annual emissions of CO2
– 22 mtCO2 in 2001, 21 mtCO2 in 2002, and 20 mtCO2 in 2003. Emissions quotas are allocated
to each emitter for free based on historical emissions (i.e. grandfathered), subject to certain rules
that give preference to CHP emitters. On average, the quotas allocated represent 73% of historic
emissions in 2001, 69% in 2002 and 66% in 2003, but the actual allocations range between
100% and 62% depending on the producer. The penalty for exceeding the quota is a fine of
€5.40 per tonne of CO2. There are 500 electricity producers in Denmark, but the scheme
                                                
14 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, Official Journal of the European
Communities, 2 February 2001, Article 71. According to a background paper issued by the European
Climate Change Programme, an earlier draft was more detailed and viewed that grandfathering, if limited
to certain sectors or entities, would classify as state aid. ECCP Chairman’s Background Document 3,
“Fair competition and internal market issues”, Brussels, 16 February 2001.REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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exempts small CHP producers and wind power, reducing the number of affected installations to
just 15. Producers comply by changing their production methods, closing plants, buying quotas
from other producers, or using unused quotas that have been banked from previous years.
The European Commission decided that the Danish CO2 emissions-trading scheme constituted
state aid for the following reasons:
1.  The state gives an intangible asset (the quota) away for free. This is because the state
foregoes revenues that would have accrued if it had auctioned the quotas, for instance.
2.  The scheme is selective because it only affects the electricity sector.
3.  The scheme affects trade, particularly considering the opening up of the European
electricity market and the subsequent increase in cross-border trade of electricity.
Nevertheless, the European Commission decided to approve the Danish emissions-trading
scheme. The reasons were that the scheme had already been launched and is due to end prior to
the initiation of the EU-wide trading scheme. The large contribution of the power sector
regarding total Danish CO2 emissions (40%) was seen as justifying a selective scope.
Nevertheless, it was decided that the allocation method – by grandfathering – constituted a
barrier to entry for new entrants into the electricity sector. This was a theoretical problem only,
since the scheme expires in 2004 and the planning process for a new power plant is longer than
three years, but the Commission insisted on the principle that extra quotas be reserved by the
state and granted to any newcomers.
Case 2. The UK emissions-trading scheme
The UK emissions-trading scheme includes incentives and allowances. The incentives are in the
form of money in return for absolute GHG emissions reductions. “Direct participants”, or
companies that do not participate in the climate change agreements, can bid for these incentives
in an auction. The allowances are tradable on the market and are allocated for free to companies
participating in the climate change agreement when companies overachieve. All six GHGs
controlled by the Kyoto Protocol are included. The budget for the incentive system is £43
million per annum: this incentive system is justified by the fact that companies must cover the
additional costs of undertaking absolute reductions in GHG emissions.
The European Commission found that the UK scheme constituted state aid under the four
criteria, including the provision of funds as an incentive to participate. As in the Danish case,
the Commission argued that allocating the allowances for free constituted the granting of an
intangible asset by the state for free.
15 Moreover, the UK scheme was found to be different from
the Commission’s proposed EU-wide scheme (for instance, the UK scheme is voluntary, it has
incentives and its scope is limited). Still, the Commission decided to approve the UK scheme.
First, the EU-wide instrument had not yet been adopted. Second, emissions trading is a good
instrument in principle and well orientated towards competition. Third, the UK’s was the first
multi-sectoral trading scheme. Fourth, although it was different from the proposed EU-wide
scheme, it could lead to an interesting learning effect. Finally, the bidding process limits the
amount of incentive money available. The European Commission’s decision was also guided by
the fact that the UK scheme was limited in duration and the UK government was ready to accept
links to wider schemes via mutual recognition.
                                                
15 The UK government argued unsuccessfully that trading allowances were not state aid because they
corresponded exactly to the amount of effort that companies would need to expend to reduce pollution.
But ECJ case law says that exact correspondence between effort and aid is a kind of state aid; if it were
not so, no measure would be state aid,GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
25
3.3 Linking different emissions-trading schemes
In theory, policy-makers could avoid the dilemma by forsaking a centralised, top-down trading
scheme and attempting instead to link national schemes. Indeed, even if the Commission’s
proposal for a Directive were not adopted, such linking would occur anyway through normal
market activity. Linked national schemes would share one advantage with a centralised EU-
wide trading scheme – the market would increase in size and, consequently, in efficiency.
Theoretically such linking could occur if the different schemes met basic minimal
harmonisation requirements such as a standardised currency of exchange, harmonised
enforcement mechanisms including a common penalty rate
16 and monitoring, reporting and
verification rules including a standard registry.
Nevertheless, linking separate schemes is a second-best option to the centralised top-down
approach advocated by the Commission. First, the lack of incentives for a trading scheme in a
member state with low abatement costs to link with a scheme in a high-cost member state would
cause the scheme to be dominated by buyers. In effect, this would amount to little more than a
voluntary EU trading scheme with no uniform carbon price and with different methods of
allocation and target-setting, which would create the risk of distortions to competition in the EU
internal market (Chapter 4 deals with these issues in more detail). Second, EC competition law
would play a very significant role in linked markets, so in effect the emissions market would
remain centrally overseen by the European Commission in any case. Because the EU Directive
provides more predictability than the ex-post application of EC competition policy, there is very
little reason from an EU perspective to argue for the linking of national schemes over an EU
Directive.
Nevertheless, even with the adoption of a top-down EU-wide trading scheme, linking different
schemes will remain a significant issue for policy-makers and market actors alike. This is
because the EU-wide scheme may need to take account of other schemes in the world,
particularly if IET under the Kyoto Protocol materialises only slowly or not at all.
17 The
Commission’s proposal explicitly foresees the possibility of linking with similar trading
schemes in other countries that are signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, such as Japan and, if it
ratifies the treaty, Canada. The question will also arise of how to link trading schemes in Parties
with trading schemes in non-Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, particularly the United States. There
must also be clarity about how the EU-wide emissions-trading scheme will interact with
International Emissions Trading.
Consideration of linking different schemes must take into account economic efficiency,
environmental effectiveness and distribution effects.
18
Efficiency. Linking different schemes would be undertaken mainly for reasons of economic
efficiency. Linking schemes would allow a company in one country to transfer or acquire
allowances that exist and circulate in other countries, jurisdictions or trading schemes. This
would lead to larger markets and therefore lower compliance costs. Such linking is necessary
because individual markets, especially in small countries, would not be large enough to provide
liquidity. Linking would also expose trading schemes to each other and cause an exchange of
learning and operational experiences. Problems of institutional incompatibility might arise but
this could be avoided if the linking systems agreed on a common “currency”, compatible
registries and a similar level of monitoring, registration and verification.
                                                
16 Ideally as part of enforcement there should be a common treatment of sinks, possibly based on best
practice.
17 If IET does not happen, the EU scheme might become the basis for a global scheme.
18 For a detailed analysis, see Haites and Mullins (2001).REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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Effectiveness. The environmental integrity of the trading scheme, especially the extent to which
it leads to a reduction in GHG emissions, might be jeopardised if differences in the design of
linked schemes led to trade diversion. Typically such issues concern divergent levels of
penalties, unequal enforcement of penalties and different banking rules. Different penalties in
case of non-compliance could mean that non-compliance would happen in the country with the
lowest penalty rate (a “race to the bottom”). Under certain circumstances in which the penalty
acts as a price cap (see also section 4.1.6), it might be cheaper for a company to pay the penalty
than to comply with the regulation. Although this effect can also appear in a domestic setting, it
may increase in scale in linked schemes. If penalties are designed to ensure compliance and are
set sufficiently high, as is the case for the proposed EU Directive, this risk might be purely
theoretical. Different banking rules could also be a cause of trade diversion, although the market
would be able to accommodate this as long as the allowance can be tracked, as is anticipated. If
banking is not harmonised, differences in “bankability” will be reflected in the price of the
allowances. An allowance with a long banking period should have a higher price than an
allowance with a short one.
Equity.  Equity, or redistribution concerns, could pose the single biggest obstacle to linking
different national schemes. Those countries with low (marginal) abatement costs might have
little incentive to join a system with higher abatement costs. Although net sellers in this case
would benefit from higher allowance prices, potential net buyers in the country concerned
would have to pay a higher price and therefore would lose out. In fact, the “linking-approach”
would amount most likely to a voluntary trading scheme, which, as we analyse in Chapter 4, has
very serious economic and internal-market consequences.
3.4 Linking the proposed EU-wide scheme to International Emissions Trading
It is commonly argued by business actors that the Commission’s proposed EU-wide scheme
should be fully open to permits generated under the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms, at
least in the long run. Indeed, the UK scheme allows the import of  AAUs, CERs, Danish
allowances and permits from other trading schemes,
19 as long as such schemes are based in
countries that are a Party to the Kyoto Protocol. This undoubtedly increases the flexibility for
participating firms and, by extension, reduces costs. Nevertheless, the allowances created under
any national trading scheme are legally and technically separate from AAUs and IET as
permitted under the Kyoto Protocol, even if the same concept lies behind trading at the national
or regional and the international level. One major challenge posed by linking trading schemes at
the international level would be to ensure environmental integrity while at the same time
making any linkage compatible with the rules of IET. Unfortunately, at this stage, IET rules are
still unclear.
3.5 Emissions trading as a bridge to the US?
The absence of the United States from the global climate change regime is a major shortcoming
both from an economic and environmental perspective. The US is the world’s largest GHG
emitter in both absolute and per capita terms. Even if the US withdrawal reduces the overall cost
of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol for the EU economy, as indicated by some economic
studies, the non-participation of the US is likely to cause competitive disadvantages to some
sectors, notably the energy-intensive industries.
Moreover, companies on both sides of the Atlantic will face different regulatory frameworks.
Under the rules as currently foreseen, for example, it will not be possible for a firm to import
emissions-reduction credits from a subsidiary that is located in a country that is not a Party to
the Kyoto Protocol. Companies will face different carbon prices, leading to conflicting price
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signals for investment decisions. Technological innovation could also suffer, since a lower
carbon constraint and consequently a lower carbon price would remove incentives for the
development of new technologies.
20 Finally, there is whole set of unexplored issues regarding
the relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO, including whether AAUs, ERUs and
CERs are goods or services, or the possibilities of border measures. More practically, there is
also the question of whether measures concerning the labelling and certification of energy
efficiency would be compatible with the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers. The Protocol
explicitly and directly applies to firms’ activities as well as government measures, while the
WTO applies directly only to government. As a result, it is unclear how CDM/JI relates to the
selective coverage of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in WTO and other bilateral agreements.
21
Given that the United States is unlikely to re-enter the Kyoto framework under the current
administration, it has been suggested that the US could be engaged through emissions trading.
As long as the US does not accept a target, however, there is little scope for the US to
participate in emissions trading. None of the options outlined in Box 3.2 seems likely to
materialise at the moment and re-engaging the US appears to be rather a long-term policy
objective.
Box 3.2 Options for trading with the US are limited
•  The US participates in the Kyoto Protocol, perhaps in the second Commitment Period (CP),
2013-17. This seems unlikely for the foreseeable future, given President Bush’s policy
announcement that the US will rely on voluntary measures to control GHG emissions until
2012 at the earliest, and given that negotiations for the second CP are due to begin as early
as 2005.
•  The Kyoto Protocol could be amended to allow trade under IET with non-Parties. such as
the US.
•  The US private sector could participate in IET via a “gateway” system to prevent net flows
from one system to the other. This last option is, theoretically, currently possible via a
secondary market. The Kyoto Party would be allowed to sell credits to a non-Kyoto Party
without restrictions, but the non-Kyoto Party would only be able to sell credits to a Kyoto
Party if those credits were offset by an equivalent repurchase of “Kyoto” tonnes of CO2.
Other issues still have to be worked out, such as how the gateway would be maintained.
•  The US could operate a domestic or hemispheric scheme and offset the domestic price with
trades with non-Annex B countries. This would be independent of the Kyoto Protocol’s
trading scheme (IET), but eventually could lead to convergence with the Kyoto trading
scheme.
•  If IET does not materialise, the EU could decide to open the proposed EU-wide trading
scheme to allowances from the US and other non-Parties.
                                                
20 Buchner et al. (2001).
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CHAPTER 4
DESIGN OPTIONS FOR EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
ne of the reasons for the great volume of discussion around emissions trading in the
European Union is that the subject represents a very novel approach to controlling
pollution. It is true that tradable allowances exist for pollution in other countries,
notably SO2 trading in the United States, and for other sectors in Europe, such as milk quotas in
the European Union. Nevertheless, the proposed EU-wide emissions-trading scheme is
unprecedented in its size and scope, controlling the emissions of a basic by-product of economic
activity. For this reason, some observers have suggested that emissions trading represents a
paradigm or a systems shift in EU pollution control, and that extra attention should
consequently be paid to the details of the trading scheme. Some commentators and stakeholders
also argue that, due to the great uncertainties that might be associated with emissions trading,
participation should initially be voluntary.
4.1 The concept of emissions trading: Cap-and-trade or baseline-and credit?
The theoretical literature suggests that the ideal tradable permit systems should be mandatory,
allowance based (i.e. cap-and-trade), upstream (i.e. having effect at the point of fuel production
or import), with allowances being auctioned and the proceeds recycled. Once in place, the
trading schemes would replace other instruments. Evidence from the “real world” in Europe and
the United States presents a somewhat different picture. There already exists a mixture of
allowance-based, credit-based and hybrid schemes, most of which are mainly downstream
(where the scheme has effect at the point of consumption). The allocation of allowances tends to
be done by grandfathering, where allowances are allocated to companies for free based on their
historical emissions. Auctioning is the exception rather than the rule, moreover, and it tends to
cover only a small part of overall allowances, mainly to facilitate new entrants. The UK scheme
is based on voluntary participation. There are pressures within the EU to allow for the extension
of national climate policies based on other instruments such as voluntary or negotiated
environmental agreements (NEAs). It is therefore useful to discuss the different design options
and their possible influence on the economic and environmental outcome of the trading scheme.
In the cap-and-trade system, which is the standard model for tradable permit schemes, an
absolute limit is placed on total emissions. Typically, each company’s emissions are capped by
the allocation of allowances for the controlled pollutants. Companies must ensure that they stay
below these caps, either by reducing their emissions through taking action or by buying
additional allowances, depending on which is cheaper. Companies that reduce their emissions
below the allocated cap can then sell the surplus permits to other companies, if the price is right,
or they may bank them for later use. The underlying premise is that emitters incur different
costs in reducing emissions. If emissions allowances are tradable, emitters with low abatement
costs can cut emissions below the cap and sell their surplus allowances to high-cost emitters, if
the allowance market makes this attractive.
The alternative model is a so-called credit-based scheme. Here, credits are created (i.e.
“earned”) when an emitter reduces its emissions below the level required by existing source-
specific limits set by regulation or an NEA. Importantly, targets in a credit-based scheme can be
expressed in absolute terms (i.e. as absolute caps on emissions) or specific terms (i.e. as energy-
efficiency targets). In Europe many major industries have NEAs based on relative targets and
are therefore reluctant to accept absolute caps. As a result, credit-based schemes are sometimes
seen as a bridge to the point where industry will accept absolute caps and move over to a cap-
and-trade system (see also Appendix 1).
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Currently, various national initiatives adopt elements of both models. For example, the UK
emissions-trading scheme (DEFRA, 2001) combines a cap-and-trade system with credit trading.
This is because large parts of the UK industry had already negotiated voluntary agreements
based on relative targets in return for a rebate from the Climate Change Levy, an energy tax.
Similarly, the French trading initiative proposed by the business grouping Entreprises pour
l’Environnement mixes absolute and relative targets from the outset in a credit-based system
(EpE/MIES, 2000). In this case the main reason was the public perception that a cap-and-trade
scheme would constitute a “license to pollute”. Denmark (the first country to have an emissions-
trading scheme up and running, which was launched in January 2001), Norway and Sweden
have all opted for a pure cap-and-trade scheme. These decisions were motivated by the desire to
guarantee both simplicity, a major concern to business, and certainty of reaching the target, the
main priority for governments and environmental groups. The proposed EU-wide trading
system is also based on a cap-and-trade system.
Although there is no theoretical argument in favour of either system, experiences in the US
show that credit schemes tend to have higher transaction costs in practice (Klaassen, 1996 and
Stavins, 2001). The main reason lies in the difference of allocation method. In a baseline and
credit system, permits are allocated ex post. The US credit-trading schemes were characterised
by political uncertainty regarding target-setting and verification, subsequently leading to
successive regulatory changes (Godard, 2000). Political bargaining of this kind is largely absent
in cap-and-trade programmes as well as in credit-trading schemes that are based on absolute
targets, except for the initial political decision that sets the overall number of allowances.
Although it is true that credit trading reduces the likelihood that governments will charge for the
allocation of allowances, credit-based schemes imply that trading cannot really begin until
towards the end of the compliance period, except for some forwards or derivatives trading.REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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Credit-based schemes also have the tendency to limit the market de facto to companies that emit
GHGs, whereas cap-and-trade systems have the advantage of promoting trading immediately,
since the commodity (the allowances) becomes available with allocation. A cap-and-trade
scheme should also have more liquidity because it encourages the participation of non-natural
traders such as brokers and arbitrageurs.
4.1.1 Indirect or direct emissions?
In the specific case of electricity generation, emissions may be apportioned either directly,
where emissions are reported at the place of generation, or indirectly, where the emissions are
recorded at the point of consumption. The proposed EU Directive has chosen the former while
the UK has opted for the latter. The advantage of indirect apportionment is that emissions are
recorded closer to the polluter (i.e. the consumer), which is more in line with the polluter-pays
principle. In a system based on indirect apportionment, in addition, regulators can more readily
decide for which sectors to include emissions from electricity. Under the indirect system, it can
be decided whether to cover all electricity generation or simply the electricity that is used by the
controlled sectors (e.g. industry consumers). In the case of direct emissions, such a distinction
cannot be made. The disadvantage of indirect apportionment is that end-users are not
responsible for the choice of fuel used to generate the power they consume.
The practical relevance of this question is demonstrated by the possible effect of the proposed
EU Directive on the heating markets, where CHP would be covered by the proposed Directive
but competing fuels (e.g. gas in condensation boilers) would not. The reporting of emissions
indirectly would avoid such problems, although this specific CHP problem could also be
resolved by exempting the proportion of fuel used in CHP plants for the heating market
(Stronzik and Cames, 2002).
A disadvantage of indirect apportionment is that there is a need to assign an emissions factor for
electricity, making the system more complicated. This is especially true for the European Union,
where power is traded across borders but generation portfolios differ markedly. Ideally there
should be different emissions factors for the different processes of generating electricity, which
would require electricity to be certified and tracked. In contrast, applying an average emissions
factor (e.g. the weighted average of emissions by a particular fuel mix) would annul the
incentives for reducing GHG emissions in electricity generation by means of fuel switching,
efficiency or the use of renewable energy sources, because all electricity, no matter how it is
produced, would be counted on the basis of the average. Consequently, the power generator
would have no incentive to move to less GHG-emitting fuels and technologies because the extra
cost for the environment cannot be passed on in a liberalised market. Such lack of incentives
therefore would need to be compensated for by government subsidies or other incentives. In
contrast, direct apportionment provides the necessary incentives to power generators because
they can pass on the additional costs as a function of their reduction commitments to their
customers.
The indirect approach need not necessarily apply only to electricity. Emissions associated with
cement or glass production or any other industrial activity could similarly be apportioned to the
end user. The emissions from the cement industry, for instance, could be apportioned to the
construction industry or even house owners (see Stronzik and Cames, 2002). This would move
emissions trading very close to the point of consumption.
In any case, the question of apportionment must be resolved by a common approach across the
European Union. The simultaneous existence of different trading systems – i.e. the EU-wide
system as currently proposed and the UK system – would cause emissions to be counted twice.
Governments must choose a single system, and the above analysis suggests that direct
apportionment of emissions is both more practicable and provides better incentives to abate
GHGs.GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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4.1.2 What participants?
The designers of the trading market must strike a balance between creating a sufficiently large
market and remaining practical and simple to minimise transaction costs. The Commission’s
proposal for a Directive approaches this question by limiting the trading scheme to six sectors:
electricity production, iron and steel, cement, glass, ceramics, and paper and board. In general,
combustion plants of less than 20 megawatts are excluded. Likewise, the chemicals industry is
only covered indirectly, via on-site power plants that are larger than 20 megawatts. In all, the
proposed Directive would cover about 46% of total CO2 emissions in 2010, or about 40% of all
EU GHG emissions.
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) sometimes argue for their exclusion from the
trading scheme because of a lack of capacity to deal with such a complicated instrument.
Although in general this may be true, the argument needs some qualification. It is true that
transaction costs are usually absolute: for large economic entities with economies of scale,
transaction costs may constitute a small part of the decision whether to participate, but for small
companies the same transaction cost may be prohibitively expensive. On the other hand, the
participation of small economic entities is desirable for reasons of both efficiency (e.g.
increased liquidity) and effectiveness. Moreover, the results of a simulation study for a trading
scheme in the German state of Hesse suggest that transaction costs depend less on the size of the
company than on the characteristics of the emissions source, particularly whether the SME
operates a major on-site power plant (Hessen, 2001).
Transport and domestic/tertiary sector
CO2 emissions from transport and households are especially significant. Transport-related
emissions are expected to account for approximately 28% of the EU’s total CO2 emissions in
1998 and are expected to grow by around 50% between 1990 and 2010.
22 Households accounted
for 11% of EU emissions in 1990, although this percentage is not expected to rise over the next
decade.
23 Buildings (including residential and the tertiary sector) accounted for 40.7% of the
total energy consumption (a proxy for CO2 emissions) in 1997.
24 Most future growth in CO2
emissions will come from transport, which is projected to grow by 31% above 1990 levels under
a business-as-usual scenario. Apart from the transport sector, only emissions from the service
sector, which accounted for just 4% of 1990 emissions, are also expected to increase between
now and 2010 (by 14%).
25
Neither transport nor the domestic/tertiary sector is covered either by the proposed EU Directive
or by most of the national schemes that have been proposed or discussed. This exclusion is
explained by a mixture of political sensitivity towards price increases for transport and
household energy bills, the complexity of these emission sources, potentially high transaction
costs and inelastic demand, especially in households. Still, the Norwegian government might
take a different approach to partially cover transport and households by including heating fuel
and electricity in the Norwegian trading scheme, which in the long run intends to cover about
60% of all of Norway’s GHG emissions. In a relatively small market such as Norway, including
transport and households can increase the size of the market significantly.
                                                
22 European Commission (2001b, p. 14).
23 European Commission (2001d, p. 6).
24 European Commission (2001e).
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Although emissions from the domestic/tertiary and the transport sector can in theory be included
(see Box 4.1 for the case of transport), the need for simplicity suggests that it might be more
appropriate to exclude these sectors initially from the EU-wide system, especially given that
system’s very wide scope across at least 15 countries. Nevertheless, extension of the scheme to
include these sectors could be possible at a later stage if both the technical difficulties and the
political sensitivities are better analysed. In the meantime, it is important to ensure that non-
trading sectors bear an equivalent burden.
Box 4.1  Options to include transport in an emissions-trading scheme
Six basic options to incorporate transport in an emissions-trading scheme have been identified.
Options 1-5 assume a cap-and-trade scheme, whereas option 6 relates to a baseline and credit
scheme.
1. Production/import. Fuel producers and importers must surrender the necessary allowances. This
is generally referred to as an “upstream” scheme and would not be compatible with the proposed EU
Directive, which is a “downstream” approach targeting the point of consumption. To be adopted in
the EU, an upstream scheme would require approval by unanimity in the EU Council of Ministers,
because it reduces significantly the scope for national energy policies.
26
2. Wholesale. Fuel wholesalers, e.g. for transport and heating fuels, must cover their fuel sales by
allowances, as has been discussed in Norway. Such a scheme might be compatible with the currently
proposed EU Directive, but it might also fall under unanimity in the EU Council of Ministers.
3. Vehicle producers. Allowances must be surrendered by vehicle producers, based on the level of
emissions the vehicle will cause according to its performance and life span. Although this would
provide direct incentives to vehicle producers to improve the fuel efficiency of vehicles,
manufacturers might see the approach as too rigid a constraint on output growth. There is a further
question about whether vehicle producers can be made responsible for their products’ emissions.
4. Service providers. Allowances must be surrendered by  service providers (e.g. railways, bus
operators, airlines, etc.) while for private cars, allowances would need to be surrendered by the
driver or owner. The advantage is that service providers have a direct incentives for fuel efficiency.
Service providers might object to such constraints as a potential curb on growth, however, whereas
private car owners might see this choice as amounting to a quota on driving. Such a system might
also be very complex with high transaction costs.
5. Users. All transport  users must surrender allowances to use transport services. This would
effectively amount to carbon budgets for all individuals and/or firms that use transport. Such a
system would be certain to be politically sensitive and difficult to implement. It would also be
complex, notably in relation to measuring and monitoring individual carbon budgets.
6. Baseline-and-credit approach focusing on vehicles. Vehicles that out-perform an existing fuel
efficiency standard could obtain credits based on the assumed life cycle of a vehicle. Such a scheme
should theoretically accelerate the diffusion of more efficient vehicles. A baseline-and-credit scheme
focusing on transport users is currently being explored by the French industrial grouping Entreprises
pour l’Environnement (EpE). The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has introduced a
similar programme for a number of pollutants.
27
                                                
26 “…measures… “ that are “significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy
sources and the general structure of its energy supply” are according to Art. 175 of the EC Treaty subject
to unanimity in the EU Council of Ministers and withheld from co-decision with the European
Parliament.
27 An example of a credit-trading programme (of a voluntary nature) with mandatory performance
standards is the averaging, banking and trading provisions of the emissions standards for a variety of
pollutants caused by heavy-duty truck and bus engines in the US. The programme, which was established
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4.1.3 The project mechanisms
The Commission’s proposal does not foresee the inclusion of credits from the project
mechanisms CDM and JI, as established under the Kyoto Protocol (see also Appendix 1). The
Commission bases its preference on “outstanding issues regarding their environmental
integrity”, especially the use of carbon sinks as CDM projects, but agrees that their eventual
inclusion is desirable. Critics have argued that since it is assumed that marginal avoidance costs
in countries that are likely to host CDM and JI projects are lower than in the EU, excluding the
project mechanism is likely to lead to higher allowances prices than would otherwise be the
case.
As the exclusion of the project mechanisms is, according to the European Commission, only
temporary, the real issue is how to achieve their inclusion while maintaining environmental
integrity. This is a question that relates to substance (e.g. the definition of the project
mechanism), procedure and timing.
Regarding substance, there are two ways to include the project mechanisms. First, the EU could
apply the rules as agreed in the UNFCCC negotiations. Second, the EU could specify separate
rules for the EU-wide trading scheme, in essence creating a separate “EU CDM” and “EU JI”.
Creating  separate CDM- and JI-style projects would entail different rules for trading
internationally and within the EU. Should the EU decide that international rules are not
sufficiently robust to allow for a credible emissions market to evolve, however, it could still add
additional requirements if there is a case to be made.
28
Regarding procedure and timing, the Commission has stated that it will propose a new, separate
Directive to include the project mechanisms in the trading scheme; the Directive would be
proposed separately so as to avoid contentious debates that could delay the adoption of the
proposal for an EU-wide trading scheme. In the case of CDM, conditions for inclusion should
be based in principle on international rules as agreed in the UNFCCC, which are likely to
become operational by the end of 2002. The EU would be free to set legitimate additional
eligibility requirements for the project mechanisms. Once the international trading system is in
place, the EU could review its additional requirements in the light of those rules. Should the
international regime not materialise, moreover, the EU’s scheme would represent a significant
market for CDM credits and would provide sufficient certainty to companies that projects will
represent a safe investment.
For JI, the situation is more complicated because the outlook for JI is expected to remain
uncertain for the medium term. In the meantime, important questions such as the recognition of
baselines have yet to be resolved. The EU could therefore propose a “early EU JI”, again with
restrictions if there is a case to be made for them. Companies would be free to choose between
operating on the basis of the firm rules of the “early EU JI” or the prospective rules of JI under
the international regime, which will emerge at a later stage. “Early EU JI” could include
accession countries, and it could also have the advantage of providing a potential incentive to
Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, thereby almost certainly bringing the Protocol into force.
This would be along the lines of the proposed Green Investment Scheme (GIS), a Russian
                                                                                                                                              
standards for engines can be credited for averaging, banking or trading (BAT provisions). Here, averaging
means that credit offsets for engines manufactured during the same year whose emissions are better than
the performance standard. The objective is to make credits fungible with other trading programmes by
2004 (Stavins, 2001), thereby combining mobile and stationary sources and providing incentives for
improved fuel efficiency.
28 Some members of the Task Force additional rules, including but not necessarily limited to the ongoing
exclusion of sinks projects, citing concerns over the environmental benefits and permanence of such
projects. Others argued for the prompt inclusion of the mechanisms with few additional rules beyond
those applying under the UNFCCC.REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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proposal to allow investments in Russia in exchange for AAUs, even in advance of the Kyoto
Protocol’s first Commitment Period (2008-12). Under this proposal, the sale of Russian surplus
AAUs would be made conditional on the recycling of the revenues into domestic projects in
Russia that lead to equivalent GHG emission reductions (Korppoo et al., 2002).
4.1.4 What gases?
At present, the proposed EU scheme is limited to CO2. The reason for the Commission’s more
restrictive approach is that it believes that the other gases are difficult to monitor with
comparable accuracy. The industrial gas SF6, for instance, has a global warming potential
(GWP) 24,000 times that of CO2. The Commission’s proposal leaves open the possibility of
further gases being included through an amending proposal. Such an amending proposal would
fall under the EU’s “co-decision procedure”, which gives the European Parliament and the
Council of Ministers joint say in whether a Directive should be adopted. A lighter procedure
would be to allow the emissions-trading Directive (once adopted) to be amended to cover non-
CO2 gases. Such an amendment could be done by a process known as “Comitology”, in which
an administrative act is passed by a regulatory committee comprising representatives of member
states’ administrations and chaired by the Commission).
29 It is unlikely that the European
Parliament, which opposes Comitology on grounds that it undermines the Parliament’s power of
co-decision, would accept such a procedure, however.
This exclusive coverage of CO2 contrasts with the UK scheme and the proposed Norwegian
scheme, both of which cover all six GHGs. The internal BP scheme covers CO2 and methane,
and France has a N2O tax, meaning that this gas is measured there. Thus, there seem to be no
structural issues related to measuring and monitoring of at least some of the non-CO2 GHGs,
and in fact the problem seems to be a lack of capacity in some member states. This could be
addressed by amending the proposed Directive so that member states can include all six gases if
they can prove that measuring is ensured. There is a risk that different gas coverage in different
member states will cause distortions to competition, however, especially if non-CO2 GHGs were
regulated in some countries (at member state level) and not in others. An EU Directive
incorporating all six gases in principle could serve as an incentive to move towards adequate
monitoring in those member states where this is not yet the case. In the meantime, the European
Commission should consider capacity-building measures for those member states with
shortcomings in monitoring; such measures should also be implemented promptly for the
accession countries.
4.1.5 Banking
One of the lessons of the US SO 2 scheme (see Box 4.2) is that banking of permits can lead to
earlier reductions than would have occurred if it had not been allowed. Banking encourages
early reductions by allowing participants to store unused allowances for future use. Banking not
only encourages early reductions and over-compliance but also gives companies flexibility in
the timing of their investments to abate GHG emissions, because it is an effective tool to smooth
the investment cycle with greenhouse gas emissions reduction measures and therefore is likely
to reduce compliance costs. For banking to work, allowances must remain valid over a long
period of time. To allow banking and make banked allowances valid into the Kyoto Protocol’s
commitment periods would give an incentive for governments to be less generous to “their”
companies when allocating allowances in the pre-Kyoto commitment period. With banking,
governments must hand out assigned amounts to any company that banked permits during the
years before the Protocol’s first Commitment Period (2008-12). In this way, banking would go
some way towards addressing the concerns discussed above in section 3.2 that different
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companies in the Internal Market would be treated differently (see also Egenhofer and Mullins,
2000).
Box 4.2  The effects of banking in the US SO2 trading scheme
Evidence from the SO2 emissions-trading scheme in the US suggests that banking led to earlier
reductions than would have occurred if banking of permits had not been permitted. For example, in
1996, those units affected by SO2 caps emitted considerably less than their collective emissions
limits foresaw. The US EPA attributes these “excess” reductions to banking allowing participants to
garner the benefits of over-control through the storage of unused allowances and by assuring that
those allowances will retain their compliance value in the future. It is likely that companies banked
allowances in anticipation of more stringent emissions targets and higher costs in the future. The
EPA concludes: “Although banked allowances will delay the full effect of the emissions cap on SO2
until 2010, the early reductions of emissions may provide greater health and environmental benefits
than would have occurred without banking” (Dudek et al., 1997). Some 8.3 million units were
allocated for the 1996 compliance year. They emitted a total of 5.4 million tonnes of SO2, which was
approximately 35% below the 1996 allowable levels. See the EPA Acid Rain website
(www.epa.gov/airmarkets). It is important to note, however, that banking is uncontroversial under
the US Clean Air Act, which has allocated permits to companies for 30 years.
Source: Egenhofer and Mullins (2000).
4.1.6 Penalties
Penalties can have two functions. First, they can be a tool for enforcing compliance in which
case, the penalty must be high enough to act as a credible deterrent for non-compliance. Second,
penalty rates can act as a safety valve against the risk of too high prices for allowances. In the
latter case, the penalty needs to be fixed at a certain, relatively low level. An example of such a
scheme is the Danish cap-and-trade scheme, whose penalty rate is set at approximately €5.40 to
limit the effect on the competitiveness of the controlled Danish firms vis-à-vis their competitors
in the Nordic electricity market.
While in the long run the integrity of the emissions-trading regime will only be maintained if
compliance is ensured, a fixed penalty rate at a low level, especially for the transition period
towards an unknown instrument, can become an efficient tool to prevent emissions trading from
damaging EU competitiveness.
30 There is also a danger, however, that a price cap could reduce
liquidity, because if set too low, it might act as a disincentive for firms to trade. The proposed
Directive has not considered the possibility of price caps for penalties and sees penalties purely
as a means to enforce compliance.
4.2 Allocation of allowances
Setting the initial allocation of tradable allowances is the most controversial aspect of any cap-
and-trade scheme. The literature generally identifies two principal ways of doing this. The first
is  auctioning, which requires each market participant to buy allowances. The second is
grandfathering, in which each market participant receives allowances based on its previous
emissions. A sub-set of grandfathering is benchmarking, in which allowances are granted on the
basis of a plant’s technologies or techniques and how these compare to other plants. More
recently, a third allocation methodology has been proposed – updating  (NERA, 2002). This
describes the constant revision of the allocation based on a plant’s current and future activities.
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McKibbin and Wilcoxin (1997); and Hourcarde and Fortin (2000). Although in theory, of course, if the
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The concept does not prescribe any specific methodology to be used to assess current activities
and future needs.
None of these three methodologies is perfect if evaluated against the criteria of economic
efficiency, equity and political acceptability. All methodologies will result in advantages and
disadvantages of various kinds and, most of all, in distribution effects between economies,
sectors and consumers. The key is therefore to strike a reasonable balance between sometimes
conflicting interests.
4.2.1 Auctioning is most efficient but comes at a price
Economic theory favours auctioning as the most efficient method of allocation for a number of
reasons. Most importantly, a trading scheme based on auctioning has, economically speaking,
three effects. The first is the technology effect, by providing an incentive to substitute carbon-
intensive technologies with carbon-saving ones (e.g. wind instead of coal to produce electricity).
The second is the output effect, which relates to the fact that due to the price effects, demand for
energy, for instance, will go down. The third is the revenue-recycling effect, which states that
the proceeds from auctioning should be used to lower other taxes. All three effects will only
occur if permits are auctioned. If permits are grandfathered, only the technology effect and the
output effect will occur (Sterner and Azar, 2002; see also Annex 2 for a more detailed economic
analysis).
Auctioning would also benefit installations that emit fewer GHG emissions, such as electricity
from renewable energy sources or nuclear power, or that have done most in the past to reduce
their emissions, since such early movers would have to buy fewer allowances.
31 At the same
time, auctioning leads to a price for allowances and therefore carbon, and it should thereby
facilitate the functioning of the trading market, at least initially. Auctioning has the further
advantage of providing both equal access to allowances and transparency in the granting of
allowances. This advantage makes auctioning especially suitable for the EU internal market.
Due to its high degree of transparency, auctioning would avoid the risk of distortions to
competition in the internal market, by avoiding delicate negotiations on how many allowances
are allocated to each firm, or how to treat new entrants.
The main disadvantage is that auctioning  can be seen as the equivalent of a tax, albeit one
whose rate would be fixed by the market. NERA (2002) estimates that auctioning could cost
European industry around €30 billion. This has two consequences. First, a considerable amount
of money would change hands from industry to the treasury
32 and thereby could deprive
industry of funds that are needed for research and development and investment in general in
carbon-reduction technologies and techniques. As was shown in the earlier chapters, one of the
advantages of emissions trading is that it creates a predictable long-term outlook for business,
which is crucial to trigger investment to deal with climate change, although this advantage
depends on the actual capacity of companies and financial institutions to raise funds. Second,
those industries exposed to international competition with firms that are not subject to a similar
carbon constraint would suffer. Consequently, some industries oppose auctioning for the same
reasons for which they oppose a tax, since this would annul the benefits of emissions trading. To
avoid adding extra costs to companies by auctioning, it has been argued that revenues from the
auctioning could be recycled to firms. That way, auctioning would in principle be made
revenue-neutral by equivalent reductions in other taxes. This requires the “earmarking” of
government revenues, however, and parliaments are often reluctant to accept earmarking
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32 This is comparable (although not necessarily in quantitative terms) to the auctions for the UMTS
licences (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, or “third generation” mobile communications
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because it reduces their scope for influencing the budget. Earmarking taxes also increases
government intervention and might even reduce transparency, one of the cited advantages of
auctioning.
4.2.2 Grandfathering: More equitable, less efficient?
In contrast to auctioning, which inevitably  adds costs (in absolute terms) to industry,
grandfathering, where allowances are allocated for free, has the advantage of addressing
distribution and competitiveness effects as well as continuing to allow firms to invest. This is
the reason why the majority of emissions-trading schemes has in practice been done by
grandfathering.
33 This may be particularly relevant for the specific case of the proposed EU
Directive. Most of the trading population consists of industries that compete internationally and
whose competitors in the US, for instance, are subject to a less stringent carbon constraint, if at
all. Although the literature on the connection between environmental regulation and the
relocation of firms remains inconclusive, relocation of firms as a possible result of different
climate change regimes cannot be ruled out. Grandfathering may therefore be a useful
negotiation tool to deal with this potential threat.
Grandfathering has a number of disadvantages, however. In addition to its economic problems,
which were described in the previous section on auctioning, grandfathering also poses a
potential problem to public finances if it displaces revenues from environmental taxation. This
is why finance ministries might prefer auctioning to grandfathering, particularly if revenues
from ecological taxes are used to reduce social charges. The experience in Europe suggests that
finance ministers might not be willing to give up receipts from environmental taxation to the
benefit of emissions trading. In the UK, companies that had agreed to energy efficiency targets
are only entitled to a partial rebate (80%) from the Climate Change Levy. Similar plans with
partial rather than full reimbursements are being considered in France and Germany.
“Historical grandfathering”, i.e. allocating allowances to firms based on their past emissions
minus a uniform percentage, would benefit those who have done the least in the past. Still,
grandfathering can be organised in a way to avoid punishing early movers, for example by
building into the allocation a technical factor for climate-friendly technologies.
A specific form of grandfathering is benchmarking, which might – in theory – be the most
equitable approach to the allocation of allowances. In benchmarking, allocation is based on the
actual state of technology applied, taking into account past investments. This minimises the risk
that those firms that have done most to reduce their GHG emissions will be penalised.
Benchmarking needs considerable current and historical data to ensure both an equitable and
environmentally effective outcome, however. These data are available in some member states
(e.g. the Netherlands) but less so in others. It is also hard to see how such a system could work
in an enlarged European Union of up to 27 member states. Benchmarking could be an option in
the future, depending on the availability of data.
4.2.3 Updating: Target-setting linked to economic growth?
The updating approach bases allocations on a plant’s existing activities but takes account of
future needs, i.e. the expansion of a firm. This is in contrast to grandfathering, where firms
receive allowances irrespective of possible future activities. In reality, therefore, updating
approaches a relative target, but the difference is that the overall cap of the emissions-trading
scheme remains intact, thereby ensuring environmental effectiveness. The margin for updating
relates to changes of relative market shares of different firms operating under the scheme. The
principal advantage of this method is that it at least partially answers companies’ concerns that
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the trading scheme places a cap on their ability to expand and that those companies that reduce
production will benefit disproportionately. Thus, updating might be a particularly suitable
instrument for the initial period.
Nevertheless, there are disadvantages to the updating method, of which the most important
relates to economic efficiency. If allowances are allocated in proportion to a firm’s output, the
output effect (the incentive to reduce carbon by cutting output) is reduced, if not negated,
because the free allocation of allowances to an expanding plant would amount to an output
subsidy. This is similar to the problem associated with relative targets, which can also constitute
an output subsidy since the more a company produces, the more valuable allowances it receives
(see section 4.3.1 below). As with relative targets, total emissions are higher than without the
output subsidy, which means that overall compliance costs are higher than they would otherwise
be.
Although updating would ideally be based on an agreed methodology, in reality it would always
involve an element of negotiation. This will be more pronounced the more decentralised the
allocation. Should updating be chosen as the allocation method, there would be a need to create
transparent and non-discriminatory methodologies to apply it across member states to prevent
different member states from interpreting the data differently. Whether such methodologies can
be developed is unclear at this time.
The similarities between updating and NEAs – particularly its flexibility – make updating
attractive to business, although there is also a risk of perpetuating the process of target-setting.
For auctioning and grandfathering, in contrast, the politically sensitive allocation process is
generally settled with the initial allocation. In the US SO2 scheme, the allocation was settled for
the duration of the programme for 30 years. In addition, the need constantly to revise targets
means that updating tends to have higher administrative costs, and the experience of NEAs
suggests that the negotiations linked to updating would require high and costly transparency
requirements and stakeholder involvement. To make NEAs more credible, both governments
and industry have in many cases strengthened monitoring and reporting requirements, third
party verification, increased transparency and stakeholder participation when negotiating an
NEA (ten Brink, 2002). A similar development can be expected for updating should this method
remain credible in the long run across the EU.
4.2.4 Allocation: A political balancing act
Considering that none of the three allocation methods is perfect, the following general
conclusions can be drawn. The choice between grandfathering and auctioning does not
significantly affect the efficiency of the emissions-trading market in the medium and long-term,
although it might negatively affect the environmental effectiveness as a result of the output
subsidy effect and the resulting higher compliance costs. The size of this effect is questionable,
however, given existing distortions due to inefficient taxation or market power in the allowance
market. Nevertheless, auctioning generally provides stronger signals to reduce pollution to both
producers and consumers.
The choice between the two will mainly have distribution effects on the regulated sectors,
consumers and governments. Auctioning of all allowances under the proposed EU Directive
would amount to a transfer of approximately €30 billion from industry to governments.
Auctioning is therefore likely to lead to “stranded costs” and damage the competitiveness of
European industry, especially since some of its main competitors are not subject to a similar
carbon constraint. The standard remedy to address distribution impacts, the recycling of
revenues, is problematic to implement in the EU context for legal reasons. A decision at EU
level to require the recycling of revenue might require unanimous agreement in the Council of
Ministers (according to Art. 175 of the Treaty of the European Communities) and reduce the
European Parliament’s role from one of co-decision to simple consultation. This is something toGREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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which both the European Parliament and a number of member states are opposed. Still,
individual member states would be free to recycle if they wished.
Auctioning has the further advantage of being highly compatible with internal market rules due
to its high degree of transparency. Auctioning would avoid the risk of distortions to competition
in the internal market because it would not require delicate negotiations over how many
allowances would be allocated to each firm or how new entrants should be treated. Irrespective
of the allocation method chosen (grandfathering or auctioning), a number of permits must be
withheld to accommodate new entrants, either by reducing the allocated permits of existing
participants or by reserving a part of the initial permits for newcomers. The latter method is
used in the US SO2 trading scheme, where the reserved permits are auctioned annually.
Benchmarking, a specific form of grandfathering, is theoretically the most equitable approach to
allocation since it is based on the actual state of technology applied, taking into account past
investments. The main disadvantage is that it requires considerable current and historical data,
which are not universally available in the EU, let alone the candidate countries. Whether
benchmarking will become a real option in the future depends on the future availability of data.
Updating tends to be less efficient than either auctioning or grandfathering, partly because it
would have higher administrative costs and higher compliance costs due to the output subsidy
effect. Updating can provide more flexibility to firms and thereby alleviate fears that emissions
trading would place a cap on growth. The experience of NEAs implies that the use of updating
as an allocation methodology in the EU would lead to increasing transparency requirements and
stakeholder involvement.
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4.3 Setting the target
No less controversial than deciding how to allocate scarce allowances is the method of creating
scarcity, i.e. choosing the level at which to set the initial targets. Allocation and setting the
target are two sides of the same coin and as such must be considered at the same time.
4.3.1 Relative or absolute targets?
A first issue is whether targets should be absolute, i.e. based on a cap on total emissions, or
relative, i.e. based on emissions per unit of output. Cap-and-trade schemes can in effect only
function on the basis of absolute targets, but baseline-and-credits schemes can accommodate
both relative and absolute targets.
The ability of baseline-and-credit schemes to accommodate relative targets more easily may
constitute an advantage, particularly given the fact that a great majority of NEAs in Europe are
based on relative targets (ten Brink et al., 2002). Baseline-and-credit schemes therefore have a
potential to become a bridge to move from NEAs to emissions trading (Egenhofer, 2002) and
thereby reduce the costs of transition to an economy governed by emissions trading.
It is argued sometimes that relative targets are less restrictive on economic growth than absolute
targets, which are sometimes seen as a cap on the ability of the economy to expand. This does
not necessarily need to be the case, however. Although absolute caps do in theory impose an
absolute restriction on the amount of GHGs emitted, their effect on a company’s growth
depends on both the severity of the cap itself and the allowance price. The cap in return is
dependent on the level at which it is initially set as well as the digression (indeed, an increase in
the number of allowances is at least theoretically possible) and the baseline year. The allowance
price will be influenced by the size and liquidity of the allowance market, including whether
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allowances can be obtained from outside the EU (through the use of the project mechanisms, for
instance). To minimise risks of ever-rising allowance prices, one possibility would be to set an
initial penalty at a fixed level (say €20 or €30), which would in effect act as a price cap on
allowances. This has been done in the Danish scheme, where the penalty rate has been set at
approximately €5.40.
Although relative targets may remain attractive to industry, especially in times of high growth,
the situation may be reversed in times of slow or negative growth, since efficiency
improvements are mainly linked to investment. If such new investment does not take place,
targets would most likely not improve. More recently, the economic literature has also indicated
that relative targets in fact constitute an output subsidy, as recently outlined in a study by the
finance ministry of the Netherlands (Koustaal et al., 2002). Relative targets can lead to perverse
incentives such as the production of unnecessary product units, because of the subsidy inherent
in the allowance. This requires, as a consequence, higher permit prices – and therefore higher
overall costs – for relative targets than in the case of absolute targets. The real effects may not
be as high as the theory suggests, however, given existing distortions due to inefficient taxation
or market power in the emissions market.
Absolute targets are often preferred because they bring a greater certainty regarding the final
emissions. The UK experience revealed that the UK government prefers cap-and-trade schemes,
which provide better assurance of meeting the agreed target. On the other hand, uncertainty due
to the ever-increasing emissions from the transport and household sectors is most likely to be
higher than any uncertainty caused by relative targets for the industrial sector. Other
governments may value the potential risk of overshooting due to relative targets differently. In
any case, the level of uncertainty for an emissions-trading scheme would be the same as for
voluntary agreements based on relative targets. If the public and governments can accept
relative targets for voluntary agreements, there is no reason why they should not also accept
them for emissions trading.
In conclusion, relative targets could be combined with baseline and credit schemes, and both
combined could ultimately play an important role in a transition period towards emissions
trading. Baseline-and-credit schemes that are based on relative targets could smooth the
transition from NEAs to emissions trading. Whether this is feasible will depend, however, on
whether baseline-and-credit schemes with relative targets would be compatible with an adopted
EU-wide emissions-trading Directive. Whether such schemes can live up their expectations
remains to be seen. To date there is no major experience (to the authors’ knowledge) of credit-
and-baseline schemes in the EU, although there is some to come in the UK.
4.3.2 Target-setting and the internal market
Setting the target depends on many more variables. The proposed Directive mentions (in its
Annex III) the following principles that should inform target setting: i) targets should be
consistent with the EU burden-sharing agreement; ii) targets should be consistent with existing
national trajectories; iii) the technological potential should be taken into account; iv) reductions
as a result of other EU Directives (e.g. on electricity from renewable energy sources) should be
excluded; v) allocations of allowances should not be in excess of expected requirements; vi)
there must be provisions for new entrants; vii) early action should be acknowledged; and viii)
transparency and public consultation will be required.
These principles are very general and give a high degree of discretion to member states,
however. The some worry therefore was that some member states might unduly favour “their”
companies by setting easy targets. To some extent, these concerns are addressed by the
notification provisions of the national allocation plan (as required in Art. 9 of the proposed
Directive). Furthermore, EC competition law (see above, section 3.2.2) requires  ex-ante
notification, providing a well established instrument by which the European CommissionGREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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ensures that national legislation does not distort competition within the internal market or create
trade barriers. The EC state aid provisions provide the Commission with a further powerful and
proven instrument to ensure that member states do not unduly favour their own industries.
Nevertheless, there have been calls for an “objective” or more centralised system for target-
setting using, for example, standard performance rate (SPR) indicators at EU level to set the
target for each industry. Those industries that perform better than the industry average would be
set a target that is above their current output, whereas those that perform below the industry
average would be set a harder target, requiring them to reduce GHG emissions or buy extra
allowances. Such an approach would undoubtedly reduce the risk of distortions in the internal
market and favour those companies that have done most in the past to reduce their emissions,
but there are still questions regarding the availability of the necessary data to make such a
system operational. Data of a sufficiently high quality to determine an SPR seem to be available
or will be in the near future, but it is not clear whether industry would be able to provide
sufficient data to allow governments to benchmark their performance against an SPR.
4.3.3 Target-setting is multifaceted
Irrespective of which approach is taken in the end, there will always be an element of political
bargaining regarding target-setting. Even if the target were set in the end on a relatively
“objective” measure such as an SPR, additional flexibility would still be provided by decisions
relating to the baseline year, the gases included and the sectors covered. Other elements that
would affect the stringency and thereby the burden of the target include the use of relative
targets, the use of the project mechanisms and banking provisions, and the use of a fixed penalty
rate to act as a safety valve against the risk of too-high allowance prices and to alleviate fears
that emissions trading damages EU industrial competitiveness. All these elements are discussed
elsewhere in the report.
When discussing and deciding on targets it will be unavoidable that the various parameters that
influence the stringency of the target will be part of the bargaining between governments and
industry. For this reason, a focus on allocation and target-setting alone is too narrow. Any
discussion requires, for the full perspective, an assessment of the impact of other parameters
discussed above.
4.4 Voluntary participation
The case for a voluntary trading scheme is based on the argument that emissions trading
represents a paradigm shift in EU economic regulation, and that this shift will be expensive.
Since the costs of transition are likely to differ from member state to member state, sector to
sector and even firm to firm, it is argued, member states, sectors or even firms should be free to
decide whether to participate or not. Otherwise, in the case of a mandatory scheme, the
difference in transition costs would lead to distortions to competition.
If this argument is to hold true, we need to consider whether introducing a cap-and-trade scheme
indeed constitutes a systems change and whether emissions trading is by and large incompatible
with regulation (i.e. emissions or technology standards) and taxation as well as NEAs that are
based on relative targets.
4.4.1 Emissions trading – A paradigm shift?
Combining regulation with emissions trading would in fact amount to double regulation,
prescribing for a firm both the quantity of emissions (in the case of the trading scheme) and the
technology to be used (in the case of the regulated standard). This would annul the advantage of
emissions trading, which is that the polluter can abate emissions where is cheapest, leaving the
emitter with two sets of conflicting constraints. Governments, consequently, must chooseREPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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between regulation and emissions trading. Similarly, taxation and allowance trading are largely
incompatible. Taxation fixes the marginal abatement costs of compliance with an uncertain
level of compliance, whereas allowance trading fixes the level of compliance but results in
uncertain marginal costs. In practice, however, allowance trading and taxation can be combined
in a hybrid system if a price ceiling for the allowance is set through, for instance, a fixed penalty
price (as in the Danish emissions-trading scheme). If the price for allowances goes beyond the
penalty, the penalty rate effectively assumes the function of a tax with the predictable result that
marginal abatement costs are fixed, but the level of compliance is uncertain (i.e. the same effect
as a tax). Regarding the interaction of NEAs and emissions trading, the discussion above
(section 4.3.1) on the different concepts of trading schemes and the debate on relative versus
absolute targets concluded that cap-and-trade schemes are largely incompatible with NEAs if
the latter are based on relative targets, whereas baseline-and-credit schemes could be combined
with NEAs.
Returning to the original question of whether the proposed Directive on emissions trading
constitutes a systems change, a number of observations can be made. Legally speaking it does
not constitute a systems change, since to date – apart from the ACEA/JAMA/KAMA agreement
with the car industry – there is no EU-wide regulation of GHG emissions. In practice, however,
member states already regulate greenhouse gas gases through regulation, taxation and NEAs. In
reality, therefore, the introduction of a cap-and-trade scheme would amount to a systems change
for at least some areas. The foregoing analysis suggests that regulation via emissions or
technology standards would be incompatible with emissions trading and would have to be
discontinued at member state level if an EU Directive on emissions trading is adopted. The
same is true for energy efficiency requirements in the IPPC Directive, since these would amount
to double regulation. Although there are ways in theory to link emissions trading with taxation –
by setting a penalty rate to act as a price cap for allowances, for instance – or NEAs with
relative targets – through baseline-and-credit schemes, for instance – the current Commission
proposal does not allow for such a linkage. The proposed cap-and-trade scheme would by and
large be the only instrument to regulate CO2 for the affected industrial sectors.
4.4.2 Could a voluntary scheme work?
The prospect that emissions trading represents a systems change has given rise to calls from
some sectors that participation in the trading scheme should be voluntary. It is difficult to see
how a voluntary scheme could work in practice, however. It takes supply and demand to drive a
market. A basic requirement for a well functioning market is that all sectors covered by the
emissions-trading scheme have an incentive to take part in that market. This incentive would be
given as soon as companies take on targets. Assuming that the trading scheme were voluntary at
company or sector level, the most likely outcome would be that only those firms that can easily
meet their targets would accept a cap. The most likely outcome would be a market with sellers
and no buyers. Similarly, allowing member states to opt out would mean that first, there would
be no uniform EU carbon price and second, those countries with low abatement costs would
have little or no incentive to join a system with higher abatement costs, since net buyers
domestically would have to pay a higher price than otherwise. Theoretically, this could be
addressed by an incentive system to entice buyers into the market. Such incentive systems are
prone to fall subject to EC rules governing state aid, however, and they would add a further
layer of government intervention. The likely consequence would be tension in the internal
market. The recent Commission state-aid investigations into the Danish and UK emissions-
trading schemes and the German Freiwillige Selbstverplichtung (voluntary commitment) may
offer a taste of things to come.
Combining emissions trading with an NEA could be a useful but incomplete way to create an
emissions-trading market. NEAs such as Germany’s Selbstverpflichtung may lead to overall
emissions reductions, but such agreements are inherently non-transparent since they involveGREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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burden-sharing arrangements between firms that necessarily must be worked out in secret
negotiations. Different voluntary systems might not necessarily be compatible with each other,
reducing flexibility for the market participants. Voluntary systems also depend on a kind of
altruism. Without incentives to join a trading system, a firm in a sector that has accepted a
reduction target will be reluctant to bear the cost of reducing emissions unless it receives
compensation from the other firms within the group that are also benefiting from the scheme.
This disadvantage could arise in the UK trading scheme among participants in the Climate
Change Levy that have delegated their trading authority to their sector association.
4.4.3 Nevertheless, a temporary voluntary scheme could address the costs of adaptation
Although a voluntary trading scheme does not appear to be a preferable option, there is still
scope for temporarily introducing voluntary elements in a trading scheme. This could address
the costs of adaptation, facilitate  capacity-building (e.g. administrative, monitoring, trading
infrastructure, etc.) and help to overcome political obstacles to introduce a trading scheme. A
precondition is that participation in emissions trading must become mandatory according to a
definite timetable, because an emissions-trading scheme based on voluntary participation
forever will not work.
Such temporary elements of voluntarism could be done through opt-outs via enabling clauses.
These enabling clauses could be set at three possible levels: EU member state, sector and
company. All three options have serious negative effects that need to be weighed against the
potential benefit of reducing transition costs.
i.  Member-state level. The most radical approach would be to allow member states to opt
out of the trading system. This would almost certainly lead to different national carbon
prices across the EU and therefore to disjointed national carbon markets in the EU. The
result would most likely include not only a fragmented internal market but also lower
efficiency gains due to lower liquidity and reduced market size.
ii.  Sector level. Enabling clauses at sector level equally risk leading to distortions to the
internal market and would need to be carefully aligned with EU internal market and
competition law. The argument that enabling clauses at member state level would lead
to lower economic efficiency also holds for opt-outs at sector level. The main difference
is that opt-outs at sector level would not prevent a uniform EU carbon price, provided
that not all sectors of a given member state are excluded.
iii.  Company level. The effects of enabling clauses at company level are similar to those at
sector level, with two exceptions. Opt-outs at company level might create distortions to
competition not only within the EU but also within a member state. Thus, if companies
feel that an opt-out is a better deal, the whole sector might pursue this road, leading de
facto to opt-outs at sector level.
The crucial issue is how opt-outs are decided upon. If the decision is left to member states, there
is no difference in the outcome between enabling clauses at member state, sector or company
level, since a member state might decide to allow its entire industrial sector to opt out of the
scheme. The situation would be different if opt-outs were decided at EU level, for instance by
obliging member states to make the case for opt-outs (e.g. by proving that there would be high
transition costs) and, crucially, to propose credible and transparent measures that lead to
comparable results. The requirement that non-participating sectors and companies undertake
comparable efforts is particularly important to prevent the non-trading sectors from free-riding
on the efforts of the trading sectors. A further negative consequence would be that the years in
which opt-outs exist are likely to be high-emission years, making the target harder to achieve
later. Should any opt-outs be granted in such a way, the initial “voluntary” phase would in factREPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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be better described as a translation period, whereby existing national policies are translated into
an EU-wide emissions-trading scheme.
4.4.4 Elements of “voluntarism” in a translation period
If we accept the value of a translation period to minimise the costs of transition and allow for
capacity-building with the certainty of a future mandatory scheme, there are differences of
opinion about what lends itself well to “voluntarism” and what does not. Participation during
this translation period could become voluntary with regard to sector coverage, gases or targets,
for example (see above sections on allocation and, especially, target-setting). Companies would
be free to opt in or out of a trading scheme by choosing whether or not to accept a target. The
definition of the target (its stringency and whether or not it is relative or absolute) could become
a crucial element in informing the choice of whether or not to join the trading scheme. For
example, a relatively soft initial target could constitute an incentive to join a scheme that is
initially voluntary but will become mandatory. Caps on allowance prices through a fixed penalty
rate could also make the scheme more attractive to undecided participants. Another incentive to
join a voluntary scheme could be the possibility to bank allowances into the Kyoto period (on
the basis of clear and transparent rules). Similarly, it needs to be ensured that those staying
outside the trading scheme undertake comparable action.
On the other hand, it is essential that monitoring, verification and registries, and data collection
in general to inform the choice for allocation – irrespective of which method is chosen in the
end – are all essential for capacity-building and should be mandatory from the earliest stages,
given that the trading scheme must eventually become mandatory.
Theoretically, a distinction could also be made between mandatory and voluntary participation
with regard to the size of the company. For example, big companies (depending on an agreed
threshold) could be obliged to participate whereas SMEs could be free to choose whether or not
to participate. Whether such a distinction would be feasible depends on which sectors are
covered. The proposed Directive does not foresee the inclusion of SMEs on a considerable
scale.GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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APPENDIX 1
TYPES OF EMISSIONS TRADING
Trading, one of mankind’s oldest activities, requires only two elements: a tradable commodity and a
willing seller/buyer. The emissions reductions established by the Kyoto Protocol, the different
economic states of the signatories and the preferences of certain countries, especially the US, make
GHG emissions trading almost inevitable. Previous emissions-trading programmes have taken one of
two forms, credit trading or allowance trading, but it is possible to envisage other design options.
It is important that the correct terminology be used and the proper distinction maintained between
terms such as “assigned amount”, “allowance”, “credit”, etc. Much confusion and misunderstanding
have been caused in the past by the incorrect usage of terminology.
1. Credit Trading
In credit trading. emissions credits are generated when emissions are reduced below an agreed
baseline. This may be based on absolute criteria (e.g. tonnes of CO2-equivalent per annum) or
relative criteria (e.g. tonnes of CO2-equivalent per unit of output). These emissions credits can then
be traded. By their nature credit programmes tend to be associated with specific sources or projects.
Where the baseline forms an absolute cap on tonnage then this form of credit trading is fully
equivalent to allowance trading (see below).
The nature of credit trading requires the certification of trades in order to quantify the emission
reductions. If the credit trading is associated with voluntary or negotiated agreements, these
mechanisms may already be in place.
Credit trading does not, in general, guarantee the achievement of absolute targets.
Emission Reduction Units, generated from JI projects, and Certified Emission Reductions, generated
from CDM projects, can be regarded as examples of emission credits that are generated against a
baseline (one that will require international recognition). Once acquired, both kinds of credits are
added to the assigned amounts of the acquiring country and can then be traded in absolute terms.
2. Allowance trading
Allowance trading begins by defining an aggregate emissions cap (such as a proportion of a
country’s Kyoto target). The emissions authorised by this cap are then allocated to eligible entities.
By allocating a finite number of allowances to emitters the government puts a cap on total emissions
covered by the system.
The two most important factors in any allowance trading system are the coverage of the system and
the allocation of allowances. The allocation of allowances is a highly political process in which
Governments take account of wider political objectives such as energy and social policies.
Since JI and CDM credits are added to the assigned amount of the acquiring country they can be
directly used for emissions trading.
In general, programmes imposing emission caps coupled with allowance trading have performed
well, whereas credit-trading systems have generally not met expectations. Credit-trading systems
have proved to be less secure environmentally and have created higher transaction costs and greater
uncertainty and risk than allowance trading.
Sinks that create direct real reductions can be used as credits in a capped allowance trading system.
3. Combination of trading systems
It is feasible, although more complex, to combine different systems if there is a common currency
(e.g. tonnes of CO2 equivalent, as is defined by the UNFCCC) and provided that appropriate
allocations are agreed by all parties. Great care needs to be taken to ensure that there is no double
accounting (of either positive or negative impacts), no leakage and no “free-riders”.
Source: UK Emissions Trading Group.48
APPENDIX 2
AUCTIONING VS GRANDFATHERING: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords set rules for the international trade of carbon
permits from 2008, and the EU has agreed on a scheme to redistribute its overall reduction burden
between the 15 EU member states. Each country has the authority and responsibility to control its
own emissions and to choose the mix of policy instruments it sees fit. This choice contains several
difficult aspects. One of these is how to allocate carbon permits within the economy. It is incorrect to
argue, as some do, that these are domestic issues and do not require harmonisation. Auctioning
would be the best instrument for allocation, but if some countries choose to allocate permits freely,
their competitors in other EU countries would argue that they face an unfair burden. This could well
trigger the proverbial “race to the bottom” as each country competes to be the most business-
friendly.
To explain the various effects that would result from the different ways of allocating permits, we
need to consider the mechanisms through which a policy instrument operates. Let us consider the
case of a tax on fossil carbon, which has three different effects:
1.  It provides an incentive to substitute carbon-saving technologies for carbon-intensive ones:
for instance to use wind instead of coal in producing electricity. This is the  technology
effect.
2.  Some electricity will still be produced using gas or coal and the tax on these sources will
make electricity more expensive leading households and industries to use less electricity.
This is the output-effect.
3.  Finally there is a revenue recycling effect, since the tax revenue can be used to lower other
taxes at the national level.
If allowances are auctioned they will have all three effects. Auctioned allowances are, like taxes, an
ideal market instrument for this problem. If permits are grandfathered, in contrast, they will only
have effects 1 and 2, and if they are allocated in proportion to output they will only have the first,
technical effect.
The idea of the “output-effect” is that output expansion should carry an opportunity cost – the cost of
acquiring more permits or of selling those already held. If a steel plant expands its production, then
this should not lead to an automatically increased allocation of free permits because that would in
effect subsidise output expansion in a way that goes exactly against the grain of what the Kyoto
Protocol tries to achieve.
We should mention that there are many successful programmes that allocate permits on the basis of
production volume. This was the case of the US programme for the phase-out of lead from petrol,
although in this case only the technology effect was desired (since the intention was to phase lead
out by new technology, not by using less petrol).
To solve the problems of climate change, both effects, the technological and the output substitution,
are needed. Programmes lacking these effects may still be beneficial, but they will be neither
sufficient nor efficient in solving the problems. This is for instance the case of “benchmarking”
programmes such as the UK’s Climate Change Levy Agreements (CCLA) for energy-intensive firms,
which operate on the basis of relative targets for energy efficiency. Such programmes do create
incentives such as the 1
st effect above but they do not have output-substitution or revenue-recycling
effects (2-3) and thus do not fully exploit all the potential for cost-savings to the economy.
Many European countries already levy substantial taxation on energy and/or carbon emissions. If
such taxation were to be replaced by free permits, this would in effect lead to  lower  carbon
emissions costs and that would clearly be a step in the wrong direction. On the other hand, if all
carbon rights were auctioned that would imply a dramatic increase in carbon-emissions costs and
raise fears of lowered competitiveness. In the old world of competing European states each with its
own separate market, currency and legislation, competitiveness might in principle have posed such a
problem. The academic studies on the question of whether environmental regulation leads to capitalGREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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flight are usually inconclusive, but in principle the possibility of capital flight exists. In an integrated
Europe, however, it is all the more unlikely that there would be even a small loss of competitiveness
simply because all the economies of Europe experience the same conditions.
Allocation of allowances for free is difficult. If allowances are allocated in proportion to current
output, the important effect of output substitution mentioned above is lost. This is the reason why the
US often uses “grandfathering” – which means that industries receive permits in proportion to
historical levels of pollution. This is not a good principle since it rewards the least effective and
discourages new and efficient firms. Grandfathering does not in any way encourage “proactive”
behaviour. In fact if all polluters were to know that all regulators will always use “grandfathering”,
then clearly they would never  have any incentive to clean up problems in anticipation of future
legislation and policy. On the contrary, there would be quite a strong incentive for polluters to emit
as much as possible in order to get a large allocation of permits or a favourable baseline against
which to measure abatement. Since all firms would do this, it might be hard to find proven
technology that is cleaner and the development of clean technology would be slower.
For political reasons, however, the free allocation of allowances can be used to win over the
opposition to the overall idea of permit-trading and regulation. Nevertheless, as suggested above,
there is ample room for lobbying as different parties will find different arguments to support
mechanisms that benefit them individually. Given the considerable size of the rents involved in
carbon permits it seems inevitable that the ultimate mechanism chosen will be some form of
compromise between various principles. This would correspond to a notion of shared ownership of
the natural environment.
In the long run, when the permits become very expensive, the importance of allocation costs will
dominate and it is thus important that most permits should eventually be auctioned. In the short run,
however, the key issue is to get stakeholders to agree to launch a workable system. Thus in the short
run, and particularly in the pre-Kyoto phase (2005-08), the political and distribution aspects are
dominant. There could initially be a component of free allocation, most of which would be
grandfathered to pave the way for acceptance and to avoid any perceived problem of
competitiveness. There would still be a significant share of auctioning (which helps initiate market
trading and increases the reliability of the system for new entrants). The share of auctioning should
however increase over time as we move into the Kyoto Protocol’s first Commitment Period (2008-
12, during which time the US is expected not to participate) and particularly into the second
Commitment Period (2013-17), during which time it is hoped that more countries, including the US,
will participate.
Source: Discussion paper for Climate Strategies by Thomas Sterner, Department of Economics, Göteborg
University and Christian Azar, Department of Physical Resource Theory, Chalmers University of
Technology, Göteborg.50
APPENDIX 3
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAU Assigned Amount Unit, a part of the overall absolute target of GHG
emissions assigned to Annex B Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
Absolute target A cap on emissions expressed in absolute terms (e.g. X tonnes of CO2);
see also Specific Targets and Box 6.
Allowances Refers to (allowance-based) emissions trading and means the total
allowed emissions as expressed in permits, quotas or certificates for
GHG emissions that can be traded.
Annex 1 Annex 1 of the UNFCCC refers to industrialised countries (including
many economies in transition).
Annex B Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC refers to those
industrialised countries (including many economies in transition) that
have agreed to an absolute reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol.
Annex B is largely the same as Annex 1 except that Belarus and
Turkey are not included in Annex B.
BAT Best-Available Technology.
CDM Clean Development Mechanism: Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol
establishes that Annex I Parties (and firms in these countries) can
transfer certified emissions reductions (CERs) from projects in
developing countries.
CERs Certified Emission Reductions, credits generated by CDM projects.
CHP Combined Heat and Power (co-generation), which has a conversion
efficiency of 70% or more.
COP Conference of the Parties, consisting comprising representatives of
governments that are Party to the UNFCCC. The COP is the supreme
decision-making body in the UNFCCC negotiations. The seventh such
conference, COP7, was held in Marrakech, Morocco, in November
2001.
CO2 Carbon dioxide, the main GHG.
CH4 Methane.
EC European Communities, referring to the economic competencies of the
European Union.
ECCP European Climate Change Programme, the European Commission’s
programme to consult with stakeholders on climate change.
EEA
EPA
European Economic Area, comprising the 15 EU member states plus
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Within the EEA the rules of the
EU internal market apply, including a common jurisdiction.
Environmental Protection Agency (US).
EpE Entreprises pour l’Environnement, a grouping of major French
companies active in environmental issues.
ET Emissions Trading: generic term for trade of emissions certificates (see
also IET, International Emissions Trading).
EU European Union (see also EC).GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING IN EUROPE
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€ (or EUR) EU single currency, euro.
FDI Foreign Direct Investment.
Flexible Mechanisms Those market-based mechanisms established by the Kyoto Protocol
that allow the transfer or exchange of emissions reductions obligations
between Parties. Sometimes also referred to as the Kyoto Mechanisms
or Mechanisms (see also CDM, JI, ET and Box 3).
GHG
GWP
GIS
Greenhouse gas, usually referring to one of the six gases covered by
the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Global Warming Potential. The index used to translate the level of
emissions of various gases into a common measure.
Green Investment Scheme. A proposal to allow investments, for
example in Russia, in exchange for AAUs – possibly even in advance
of the Kyoto Protocol’s first Commitment Period (2008-12).
Grandfathering The practice of granting allowances in an allowance-based emissions-
trading scheme to an entity based on its previous emissions.
Hot air Quantities of unused AAUs in some Parties that could be traded in IET.
Trade of large quantities of surplus AAUs could depress the carbon
price to an extent that it could move towards zero, thereby undermining
efforts to invest in emissions reduction. Hot air arises from the fact that
the targets under the Kyoto Protocol for some Parties are higher than
projected actual emissions (e.g. in the case of Russia, Ukraine, based
on a business-as-usual scenario). Hot air may also arise out of
uncertainties due to the use of land-use changes (for the latter, see also
Sinks).
IET International Emissions Trading, as established under Article 17 of the
Kyoto Protocol, allowing Annex B Parties to trade AAUs.
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change, a scientific body created
by the UN, generally assumed to be the most authoritative source on
climate change science.
JI Joint Implementation: Art. 6 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes that
Annex I Parties (and firms in these countries) can transfer ERUs from
individual projects.
Mt Million of tonnes.
MtCO2e Millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, the most commonly
used way to express quantities of GHGs..
NEA Negotiated Environmental Agreement, also known as Voluntary
Negotiated Agreement (VNA), Voluntary Agreement (VA), Negotiated
Agreement (NA), Long-Term Agreement (LTA).
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation.
ODA Overseas Development Aid
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Parties Countries that are party to the UNFCCC. The European Union is also a
Party.
PAMs/Policies and
Measures
GHG-reduction policies that take place domestically, rather than
through the Flexible Mechanisms. The Marrakech Accords specifies
that a “significant” share of a country’s abatement effort should beREPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
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through PAMs rather than the flexible mechanisms.
Sequestration The capture of CO2 in sinks.
Sinks
SPR
The ability of land to absorb CO2. Land-use changes that lead to sinks
(such as afforestation, reforestation) or remove sinks (e.g.
deforestation), are counted against a country’s emissions.
Standard Performance Rate. Indicator of a standard emissions intensity
for any given industry or sector.
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed at
the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro,
1992). The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilise GHG
emissions at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.
WTO World Trade Organisation.53
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